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Texas Law Review 
Volume 85, Issue 7, June 2007 
Symposium 
Software Patents, Incumbents, and Entry 
John R. Allison,* Abe Dunn** & Ronald J. Mann*** 
I. Introduction 
Software patents have been controversial since the days when 
“software” referred to the crude programs that came free with an IBM 
mainframe.  Different perspectives have been presented in judicial, 
legislative, and administrative fora over the years, and the press has paid as 
much attention to this issue as it has to any other intellectual property topic 
during this time.  Meanwhile, a software industry developed and has grown 
to a remarkable size, whether measured by revenues or profitability, number 
of firms or employees, or research expenditures.  The scope of software in-
novation has become even broader, as an increasing number of devices 
incorporate information technology, requiring modern manufacturing firms 
outside the software industry to employ developers and programmers to en-
sure that increasingly diverse functions are performed more efficiently. 
Although inventors have consistently asserted their need for patents in 
order to compete with industry incumbents, patent protection has not been 
easily or consistently available for much of this period.  Rather, the legal 
system has responded gradually to the burgeoning software industry by 
broadening the scope and strength of protection for software-related inven-
tions in fits and starts.  The explosive growth of the industry is largely 
attributable to demand generated by the efficiency of software solutions; the 
expansion of the venture capital industry over the same period largely 
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explains the lack of industry concentration.1  The “garage” mentality can be 
explained by the fact that even some of the largest industry incumbents be-
gan with one or two (largely unfunded) inventors.  Also, there is every reason 
to believe that increased patent protection has contributed to the ability of 
independent inventors and smaller firms to compete.2 
Moreover, the ability to obtain patents on software always has been 
important to some of the industry incumbents, while others have exhibited 
little need for patents and displayed, in some cases, strenuous opposition to 
the patentability of software.  The incumbents are a diverse group.  Some 
produce only software; others have substantial hardware product lines.  Some 
sell to other technology firms and others sell applications to end users in a 
broad range of markets.  And some sell prepackaged software products, 
while others focus on services—custom programming, installation, or 
maintenance.  Regardless of the sector in which they participate, the 
incumbents spend massive amounts on research and development (R&D)—
about 14% of their annual revenues, more than $60,000 per employee.3  
However, there are important patterns in patenting practices that raw data on 
R&D investments cannot explain. 
This Article examines the relation between patents and the different 
business models used by firms in the software industry.  The analysis has 
four parts.  Part II provides a brief retrospective on software patents, 
emphasizing the shifting role of patents as the industry grew into its modern 
form.  Part III uses quantitative data about patent portfolios to discuss the 
role that patents play for incumbent firms in the modern era.  We highlight 
the fact that business models explain much of the pattern of patenting 
practices.  Part IV describes the use of patents in the three channels through 
which technology flows into incumbent firms—venture-backed firms, open-
source developers, and independent inventors—all of which contribute to the 
development of technologies that might supplant or improve the products and 
services currently delivered by incumbent firms.  Finally, Part V concludes 
with a brief discussion of present-day industry perspectives on software 
patenting.  As incumbents are now leading the charge on patent reform on all 
fronts,4 we can expect that some change will occur.  An understanding of the 
 
1. The number of venture capital investments in software firms increased rapidly during this 
period, from 11 in 1979, to 188 in 1989, to 1,035 in 1999.  NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, 
YEARBOOK 48 (2004). 
2. The question of incentives is more difficult, given the important roles played both by young 
entrepreneurs who have earned millions or even billions of dollars in this industry and by open-
source developers driven, at least in part, by altruistic motives. 
3. Corporate R&D Scorecard, TECH. REV., Sept. 2005, at 56, 57, available at 
http://www.technologyreview.com/articlefiles/2005_rd_scorecard.pdf. 
4. See, e.g., Perspectives on Patents: Post-Grant Review Procedures and Other Litigation 
Reforms: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. (May 23, 2006) (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and General 
Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.) (“[O]ur patent litigation system is broken.”), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1911&wit_id=5366; Brief of the Business Software 
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varying uses to which software firms put patents in their businesses provides 
a useful perspective on the types of reforms they advocate. 
II. The Rise of Software Patents 
A. Background 
Patent debates often focus on the statements and positions taken by 
noted industry participants.5  Thus, it is common to hear that “even IBM once 
 
Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1–2, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 
1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350) (arguing on behalf of leading software and hardware companies against 
the Federal Circuit’s standard for determining nonobviousness and in favor of a less restrictive 
standard); Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp. in Support of Neither 
Party at 5–6, KSR, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (No. 04-1350) [hereinafter Brief of IBM in KSR] (arguing 
against the Federal Circuit’s standard for determining nonobviousness as overly restrictive and in 
favor of a rebuttable presumption that skilled artisans will combine elements found in references 
within “analogous art”); Brief of Business Software Alliance et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 1–3, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130) 
[hereinafter Brief of Business Software Alliance in eBay] (arguing on behalf of leading software, 
hardware, digital-content, and information-technology products and services companies against the 
Federal Circuit’s mandatory injunction standard and in favor of the traditional equitable principles 
governing injunctive relief); Brief of International Business Machines Corp. as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Neither Party at 2, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) [hereinafter Brief of IBM in 
eBay] (arguing against the Federal Circuit’s mandatory injunction standard and in favor of 
traditional equitable principles governing injunctive relief); The Peer to Patent Project: Community 
Patent Review, http://www.communitypatent.org (describing the community patent review initiative 
sponsored by IBM and other incumbents). 
5. Surely the most discussed statements come from the 1994 hearings of the U.S. Trademark 
and Patent Office (PTO) on the propriety of software patents, where trenchant criticisms of software 
patents were made.  Thus the principal scientist at Adobe Systems, Inc. testified unequivocally: “I 
believe that software per se should not be allowed patent protection. . . .  I argue that software 
should not be patented, not because it is difficult to do so, but because it is wrong to do so.”  Public 
Hearing on Use of the Patent System to Protect Software-Related Inventions: Before Bruce A. 
Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office 16 (Jan. 26–27, 1994) (statement of Douglas Brotz, Principle 
Scientist, Adobe Systems, Inc.), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/ 
software/sanjose/sjhrng.pdf.  A witness for Autodesk, Inc. contended that “[t]here is absolutely no 
evidence whatsoever, not a single iota, that software patents have promoted or will promote 
progress.”  Id. at 48 (statement of Jim Warren, Member of the Board of Directors, Autodesk, Inc.).  
Oracle’s senior vice president expressed a similar view.  See id. at 23 (statement of Jerry Baker, 
Senior Vice President, Oracle Corp.) (“I cannot find any evidence that patents for software will tend 
to [promote the progress of science and useful arts].  [I]ndeed, every indication is to the contrary.”).  
On the other hand, major trade groups and software firms testifying at the same hearings expressed 
strongly held views that patent protection was important.  So, for example, representatives of Apple 
and the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturing Association, id. at 8–10 (statement of 
Richard LeFaivre, Vice President of Advanced Technology, Apple Computer, and Computer and 
Business Equipment Manufacturing Association), of IBM, id. at 78–79 (statement of Victor Siber, 
Senior Corporate Counsel, IBM Corp.), of Microsoft, id. at 66 (statement of William Neukom, Vice 
President of Law and Corporate Affairs, Microsoft Corp.), and of the Business Software Alliance, 
Public Hearing on Use of the Patent System to Protect Software-Related Inventions: Before Bruce 
A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office 18 (Feb. 10–11, 1994) (statement of Dianne Callan, Deputy General 
Counsel, Lotus Development Corp.), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/ 
hearings/software/arlington/vahrng.pdf, all provided testimony supporting the patentability of 
software.  Microsoft’s adherence to this position is notable in light of the $120 million verdict 
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was opposed to patents,” or “Microsoft did fine without patents,” or even 
“we wouldn’t have Word, Excel, or PowerPoint if earlier inventors had been 
able to acquire patent protection.”  There is a similar focus on market 
responses.  Thus prominent academics point to the limits on patent protection 
available to the software industry in its earliest days as evidence that soft-
ware could succeed in the market without patent protection.6  Of course, what 
we also see is that software patents did become important, largely because of 
market pressures.  All of this raises the question whether the software 
industry would be more competitive or innovative in a “natural state,” that is, 
without patent protection.7 
 
entered against it a few days earlier in Stac Electronics v. Microsoft Corp., 38 F.3d 1222 (Fed. Cir. 
1994).  See Lawrence M. Fisher, Microsoft Loses Case on Patent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1994, at D1 
(discussing the verdict in favor of Stac Electronics in a patent-infringement suit alleging that 
Microsoft had appropriated Stac’s data-compression technology). 
6. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for 
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1143 (1990) 
(“Thus, let us accept as a working assumption that the computer software industry has become a 
major industry without the aid of patents, and that had patents been in place in the industry’s 
infancy, the field would not have grown as it has.”).  Surveys of individual software engineers in the 
late 1980s suggest that this perspective was widespread among engineers at that time.  See Pamela 
Samuelson & Robert J. Glushko, Comparing the Views of Lawyers and User Interface Designers on 
the Software Copyright “Look and Feel” Lawsuits, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 121, 135 (1989) (finding 
opposition to patent protection for various aspects of computer programs, including algorithms); see 
also Samuelson, supra, at 1031–32 (“If the software industry neither wants nor needs the patent 
system in order to be a vital and innovative industry, then, as a matter of public policy, it is sensible 
not to use the patent system for the protection of program-related innovations.”). 
7. For example, in an article in PC Magazine, the columnist John Dvorak argued that software 
patenting is even bad for Microsoft.  John C. Dvorak, Software Patents: Microsoft’s Fatal Error, 
PCMAG.COM, Apr. 6, 2005, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1759,1781181,00.asp.  Still, recent 
scholarship strongly suggests that software patents have private value to the firms that obtain them.  
See Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Startups, 36 RES. 
POL’Y 193, 205–07 (2007) (presenting data indicating that patenting is related to the progress of 
venture-backed software firms); John R. Allison & Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of 
Software Patents, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 30–32, on file with 
authors) (finding, among other things, that software patents have significantly more total prior art 
references, nonpatent prior art references, forward citations, total claims, and independent claims 
than nonsoftware patents issued to the same group of firms in the software industry); Iain M. 
Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie, Entry, Exit and Patenting in the Software Industry 33 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12563, 2006) (finding that firms holding software 
patents associated with a particular market are more likely to enter and less likely to exit that 
market); Bronwyn H. Hall & Megan MacGarvie, The Private Value of Software Patents 31 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12195, 2006) (concluding that “the market evaluated 
software patents as unimportant ex ante” but ex post “firms in the ICT section that hold software 
patents are . . . valued at a significant premium relative to firms without software patents”); Michael 
Noel & Mark Schankerman, Strategic Patenting and Software Innovation 4–5 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy 
Research, Discussion Paper No. 5701, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=922111 
(concluding in an empirical study of the effect of software patents on R&D and market value in the 
software industry that there are large positive technology spillovers from software R&D, but that 
patenting by rivals reduces R&D investment, patenting rates, and market value, as well as finding a 
substantial patent premium in the market valuations of software firms); Robert P. Merges, Patents, 
Entry and Growth in the Software Industry (Aug. 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=926204 (debunking the portfolio thesis by showing that patent effort by 
incumbent firms correlates closely with indicators of market success). 
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Turning to the present, the narratives are more organized in some 
respects,8 but less predictable in others.9  There is also the question of why 
technology firms have such divergent reactions to software patents, 
compared to say the pharmaceutical industry where there is a dominant 
consensus that vigorous patent enforcement is the best policy.  Our discus-
sion suggests a simple explanation for the different perspectives: firms in the 
industry generally have supported software patents when it would be helpful 
to their competitive position.10  The divergent perspectives simply reflect 
divergent uses of patents for particular firms. 
B. The Early Days: From Goetz to Diehr 
In reality, software patenting predates the controversies of the 1990s 
and, indeed, predates the software industry itself.  Thus, although it might be 
a stretch to credit Samuel Morse with the first software patent,11 it is plain 
that Bell Labs received an important software patent in 1951 for its “Error-
Detecting and Correcting System.”12  Within the modern software industry, 
 
8. The most significant opponents of software patents in the United States are Richard Stallman 
and the Free Software Foundation.  The Free Software Foundation often participates as an amicus in 
patent cases, see, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of 
Petitioner, KSR, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (No. 04-1350), and also presents testimony in congressional 
hearings, see, e.g., The Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 107 Before 
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 108th Cong. 15–22 (2003) (statement of Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford 
Law School, and member of the Free Software Foundation Board of Directors).  See also Free 
Software Foundation, Opinion on Patent Retaliation, http://gplv3.fsf.org/patent-dd2.html (last 
modified Aug. 3, 2006) (explaining changes to the new GPLv3 that target patent “aggression” by 
server operators who sue others for patent infringement for using and sharing improved versions of 
programs covered by the GPL).  That perspective is more widely held in the European Union and 
elsewhere outside the United States, see, e.g., FLORIAN MUELLER, NO LOBBYISTS AS SUCH: THE 
WAR OVER SOFTWARE PATENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Wendy M. Grossman ed., version 1.03 
2006), http://www.no-lobbyists-as-such.com/NoLobbyistsAsSuch.pdf, where the opposition to 
software patents is bound up with balance-of-trade concerns.  In the European Union, for example, 
protection of software patents is generally regarded as transferring power and wealth from fledgling 
European firms to existing U.S. incumbent firms.  See, e.g., Press Release, Foundation for a Free 
Information Infrastructure, Single EU Patent Law Good for US Giants, Bad for Small EU Firms 
(Apr. 4, 2007), available at http://press.ffii.org/Press_releases/Single_EU_patent_law_good_for_ 
US_giants%2C_bad_for_small_EU_firms (describing opposition to a European Union-wide patent 
law by a European nonprofit representing more than 3,000 smaller information-technology firms on 
the grounds that it would benefit large U.S. companies at the expense of small European firms). 
9. As discussed below, incumbent firms have widely varying patenting strategies, which have 
led to different positions on important policy issues. 
10. Despite high-profile cases requiring changes to Office, Windows, and Internet Explorer, 
Microsoft executives continue to extol the virtues of software patents.  See Bradford L. Smith & 
Susan O. Mann, Innovation and Intellectual Property Protection in the Software Industry: An 
Emerging Role for Patents?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 256–58 (2004) (listing reasons why patent 
protection is superior to copyright in an article coauthored by two Microsoft executives). 
11. See GREGORY A. STOBBS, SOFTWARE PATENTS § 5.10[E][1], at 50, 53 (2d ed. cum. supp. 
2006) (characterizing Morse’s famous telegraph patent of the 1840s as a precursor to modern 
software patents). 
12. U.S. Patent No. 2,552,629 (issued May 15, 1951). 
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Martin Goetz’s 1968 patent often is regarded as the first “true” software 
patent.13  As Goetz’s memoirs explain, the ability to patent his software was 
central to his firm’s competitive position.14  Because Goetz was working at a 
period when IBM still bundled software with hardware—so that the software 
was effectively free if purchased from IBM—the only way of staking out a 
competitive foothold would be to prevent IBM from copying his product.15  
A patent was the only apparent technique by which Goetz could obtain 
protection.16  And those who have studied the market have concluded that the 
patent served its function well because its disclosure was so thorough that it 
gave competitors who had read the patent practical access to the 
technology.17 
IBM recognized the difficulty of obtaining intellectual property (IP) 
protection for software, though its market position gave it a somewhat 
different perspective.  It opposed unbundling its software because of 
“[IBM’s] present inability to protect the proprietary use of [its] programming 
systems. . . .  [The Company] must settle on whether or not, and to what 
degree, [it] can protect programs before [it] can deal adequately with the 
question of selling them.”18  As long as its software was bundled, IBM regu-
larly took the position that patent protection for software was inappropriate.19  
The parallel to IBM’s modern involvement with Linux is startling—a market 
strategy in which IBM would profit from the sales of proprietary hardware in 
a value chain joined with free software.20 
Unfortunately for IBM’s competitors, the industry’s efforts to clarify the 
scope of patent protection during the 1970s were generally not fruitful.  As 
the decade began, the case for software patenting was a strong one, based on 
the 1969 decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re 
 
13. See First Patent Is Issued for Software, Full Implications Are Not Yet Known, 
COMPUTERWORLD, June 19, 1968, at 1, reprinted in Martin Goetz, Memoirs of a Software Pioneer: 
Part 1, IEEE ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING, Jan.–Mar. 2002, at 43, 51 (discussing U.S. Patent No. 
3,380,029 (filed Apr. 8, 1965) (issued Apr. 28, 1968)). 
14. See Goetz, supra note 13, at 49 (discussing the realization that patenting and copyrighting 
software would be essential to Applied Data Research’s survival). 
15. Id. at 50–53. 
16. Id. 
17. See Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not All Bad: An Historical Perspective on Software Patents, 
11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 214–15 (2005) (discussing Applied Data Research’s 
patent of Autoflow and the resulting thorough disclosure that allowed competitors to understand 
Autoflow and attempt to improve the program). 
18. GREGORY A. STOBBS, SOFTWARE PATENTS § 1.04[A], at 39 (2d ed. 2000) (quoting 
testimony from 1960s IBM antitrust litigation). 
19. See U.S. Patent Court to Rehear Software Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1969, at 43 
(discussing IBM’s opposition to software patents in proceedings before the PTO, aligned against 
Goetz’s employer Applied Data Research); see also Samuelson, supra note 6, at 1143 (noting the 
early opposition to software patents by IBM and other leading hardware firms). 
20. See Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property Rights Still 
Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 26 (2006) (discussing IBM’s investment in open-source 
software, namely Linux and Apache, and its strategy to profit by offering a value chain that uses 
those programs). 
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Prater.21  The Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Gottschalk v. Benson,22 
however, brought Prater into grave doubt by invalidating a patent on an al-
gorithm for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary 
numbers.23  In the Supreme Court, IBM and other large hardware 
manufacturers opposed to the patent squared off against trade groups 
representing small software firms trying to gain a foothold in the industry.24  
Because the patent in question was regarded as weak by firms in the industry, 
the victory was not regarded as catastrophic, although it did diminish the en-
thusiasm for patent filings at the time.25  The 1978 decision in Parker v. 
Flook,26 invalidating a method for updating an alarm limit in a chemical 
process,27 did not make things any better, though again the narrowness of the 
decision left the industry uncertain of the ultimate question of patentability.28  
Still, many observers at the time regarded Parker as a major setback.29 
Thus, through the 1970s and into the 1980s many firms routinely failed 
to patent inventions that readily would have been patented in later decades.  
Martin Campbell-Kelly argues forcefully that the lack of clear patent protec-
tion had adverse effects on the pace of development.30  Offering an example 
regarding the invention of VisiCalc (a prominent early spreadsheet), he 
argues that the spreadsheet sector would have developed more rapidly if the 
inventor had patented the technology because competitors would have had 
access to the patent disclosure as a way to understand the technology instead 
of “reinventing the wheel” for themselves.31  Similarly, he contends that the 
proliferation of word processors by the early 1980s reflected wasteful 
 
21. 415 F.2d 1393, 1405–06 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (holding that a general-purpose digital computer 
programmed to perform certain mathematical operations in spectrographic analysis was patentable 
because the computer involved programming and was not obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000)). 
22. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
23. Id. at 71–73. 
24. See Warren Weaver Jr., High Court Denies Computer Patent for Programing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 21, 1972, at 1. 
25. See Martin Goetz, Memoirs of a Software Pioneer: Part 2, IEEE ANNALS HIST. 
COMPUTING, Oct.–Dec. 2002, at 14, 18 (suggesting that the patent was “not representative” of 
inventions in the industry and “never should have been filed or appealed”).  For a close reading of 
Benson, arguing that it is much more hostile to software patenting than Goetz suggests, see 
Samuelson, supra note 6, at 1048–62. 
26. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
27. Id. at 594–96. 
28. See Goetz, supra note 25, at 22 (noting the perceived ambiguity of Parker); N.R. Kleinfield, 
Software Patent Issue Is Murky, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1978, at D6 (reporting Goetz’s view that 
“[n]one of the computer programs that came before the Supreme Court is regarded by the software 
industry as a good example of high-level programming”). 
29. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Curbs Software Patents, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1978, at D1 
(quoting a software-trade-association representative who argued that “the [software] industry . . . 
now has no Federal protection against theft by competitors,” which he viewed as a “gigantic 
industry problem”); see also Samuelson, supra note 6, at 1076–83 (providing a detailed contextual 
analysis of Parker). 
30. See Campbell-Kelly, supra note 17, at 198–99. 
31. Id. 
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“overfishing” that would have been truncated if early innovators had 
obtained effective patent protection.32 
By the end of the 1970s, IBM’s position had changed.  After it unbun-
dled its software from its hardware in 1970, IBM entered the field of 
competition in which it had to sell its software products at a separate price 
and attempt to defend them from appropriation by competitors.33  Pressure 
from newcomers to the industry, particularly those from Japan,34 quickly 
turned IBM into an advocate for increased IP protection for software.35  And 
with the Court’s 1981 decision in Diamond v. Diehr,36 the way seemed open, 
though perhaps not yet clear, for regular patenting of the kinds of computer 
programs that were at the core of the rapidly growing software industry.37 
C. The 1980s: The PC and the First Software Patent Portfolios 
The Court’s 1981 decision in Diehr certainly was not the most 
important event of the year for the software industry.  IBM’s introduction of 
the personal computer was much more significant.  Although others had sold 
personal computers with some success—Apple and Tandy at the time were 
regarded as formidable competitors38—the introduction of the IBM Personal 
Computer (PC) transformed the software industry.39  For one thing, the 
deployment of the IBM PC and the rapid entry of parallel IBM-compatible 
 
32. Id. at 201–02, 209. 
33. See Goetz, supra note 25, at 24–25 (discussing IBM’s move to protect its source code in 
response to increased competition following the unbundling of IBM software). 
34. Japanese software developers benefited from the same government support as competitors 
in other industries on which Japan focused.  See Steve Lohr, Japan’s Hard Look at Software, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 9, 1983, at F4 (“[T]he full arsenal of government and industry backing is being directed 
at software development in Japan.”). 
35. See Goetz, supra note 25, at 24–28 (discussing IBM’s move to maintain the secrecy of its 
source code so that it could use trade-secret protection for the functional ideas carried out by the 
code in response to increased competition following the unbundling of IBM software); Angel 
Castillo, Bill Safeguards Data Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1980, at D1 (noting IBM’s support 
for the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980).  IBM’s first major IP claim in the software 
industry came at this time when it challenged Hitachi’s incorporation into its software products of 
technology it claimed Hitachi had stolen from IBM.  Hitachi Disputes Fee to I.B.M., N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 10, 1983, at D5. 
36. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
37. See Goetz, supra note 25, at 22–23 (noting the positive contemporaneous response to 
Diehr). 
38. Andrew Pollack, Big I.B.M.’s Little Computer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1981, at D1 
(discussing IBM’s entry into the personal computer market—“a market now dominated by Apple 
Computer, Inc. and Tandy Corporation’s Radio Shack division”). 
39. See MARTIN CAMPBELL-KELLY & WILLIAM ASPRAY, COMPUTER 229 (1997) (stating that 
the IBM PC became so popular that most of the major software packages were converted to run on 
the machine, which encouraged other manufacturers to produce “clone” machines that ran on the 
same software); Pollack, supra note 38, at D1 (noting that the IBM PC was a direct challenge to 
Apple and Tandy’s dominance of the market); Andrew Pollack, Next, a Computer on Every Desk, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1981, at F1 (recognizing that IBM’s entry into personal computing would 
change the market). 
2007] Software Patents, Incumbents, and Entry 1587 
 
machines40 fostered a competition for a standard operating system to be used 
on those machines, a competition in which Microsoft’s MS-DOS system suc-
cessfully dislodged the CP/M system developed by then market leader 
Digital Research, one of many companies fated to become bywords for a lack 
of market foresight in this rapidly developing industry.41  As Figures 1 and 2 
display, the need to protect that operating system would make Microsoft one 
of the first software-products firms to invest heavily in patents as a way to 
protect its core technology.42 
The other thing that came from the deployment of the PC was a vast and 
previously unimaginable market for software applications to be deployed on 
the geometrically increasing number of personal computers in the American 
workplace.43  This signaled the end (or at least diminished importance) of the 
“garage” era of software development, as the need to produce sophisticated 
applications rapidly called into existence a large number of large firms, all of 
which began to compete against each other for the attention of the limited 
available capital investors.44  Not surprisingly, the fiercely competitive land-
scape of rapid development against a backdrop of uncertainty in legal rules 
led firms to adopt very different IP strategies.  Adobe, like Microsoft, began 
to patent relatively early, apparently hoping to protect its early lead in the 
“Font Wars” of the late 1980s.45 
 
40. See Andrew Pollack, Big I.B.M. Has Done It Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1983, at F1 
(discussing the proliferation of IBM clones). 
41. A common perspective is that CP/M failed because Digital Research moved too slowly to 
upgrade its software to accommodate 16-bit processors, leaving Microsoft’s MS-DOS to gain an 
insuperable lead in that market before Digital Research ever entered.  See MARTIN CAMPBELL-
KELLY, FROM AIRLINE RESERVATIONS TO SONIC THE HEDGEHOG: A HISTORY OF THE SOFTWARE 
INDUSTRY 239 (2003) (noting that the 16-bit version of CP/M was not available until months after 
the launch of the IBM PC, giving Microsoft “an insuperable first-mover advantage”); David E. 
Sanger, The Big Guys Get into the Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1983, at F11 (calling CP/M the 
“industry standard” before it lost ground to Microsoft as a result of not being able to run on 16-bit 
architecture). 
42.  See STOBBS, supra note 18, § 11.01[B], at 525–57 (discussing early Microsoft patents on 
technology related to operating systems). 
43. See CAMPBELL-KELLY, supra note 41, at 242–64 (describing some of the thousands of 
software applications designed for the personal computer in its first ten years); Pollack, supra note 
38, at D1 (discussing IBM’s plans to foster widespread development of software for the IBM PC). 
44. See Andrew Pollack, Microsoft Has It All—Almost, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1985, at D1 
(discussing the market forces leading to the professionalization of software development); Andrew 
Pollack, Slugging It Out on the Software Front, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1983, at F1 (describing the 
end of the “cottage era” in software development and the beginning of the era of big software 
companies and correspondingly large investments). 
45. See Peter H. Lewis, The Fallout from the Font Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1989, at F13 
(noting that if Adobe had been willing to share its proprietary information earlier, it probably could 
have avoided the “font wars”); Andrew Pollack, Adobe Is Set to Disclose Technology, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 21, 1989, at D1 (describing Adobe’s plan to reveal its font technology in an effort to stay 
competitive with a joint Apple and Microsoft font project). 
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Figure 1: Patent Applications46 per Billion Dollars in Sales 
(Prepackaged Software) (1985–2001) 
 
 
Figure 2: Patent Applications per Billion Dollars in R&D 
(Prepackaged Software) (1985–2001) 
 
 
46. Throughout this Article, the tables and figures attribute applications to the year in which 
they were filed and refer only to patent applications that resulted in issued patents. 
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For the most part, however, products firms47 during the 1980s eschewed 
patent protection, apparently accepting the predictions of the National 
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU)-
like pundits advising that copyright law would provide adequate protection.  
Thus, Figures 1 and 2 group together under the title of “Late Patentees” 
Autodesk, Computer Associates, and Oracle (the three leading products firms 
of the time that have survived and have substantial patent portfolios today).  
Two obvious factors can explain the change of strategy.  The first would be 
the belated discovery48 (as the patent applications filed in the 1980s matured 
into issued patents) that some of their competitors already were amassing 
substantial portfolios.49  There was considerable uncertainty about the 
reliability of software patents even after Diehr,50 and firms that saw them as 
less crucial than Microsoft and Adobe easily could (and did) forego them.  
The other is the decision in Computer Associates v. Altai 51 and its progeny 
such as Lotus v. Borland 52 signaling the limited ongoing reliability of copy-
right as a system for protecting innovation in software.53 
D. The 1990s: Proliferation of Software Patents 
As others already have documented in detail, the 1990s brought a rapid 
acceleration in the growth of patents in the software industry, as the problems 
with copyright became more evident, as the legal environment became more 
supportive, and as the pace of software innovation grew with the spread of 
 
47. We discuss in more detail below the distinction between software firms that profit primarily 
from the sale of off-the-shelf products and those that profit primarily from the sale of software-
related services. 
48. One reason that the discovery was “belated” is that the PTO seems to have dragged its feet 
considerably in response to the patent applications that the software firms started filing in the mid-
1980s, which had the effect of increasing the head start of applications that those firms had by the 
time their competitors learned of the applications. 
49. The tone of surprise is evident from the press coverage that greeted a 1989 patent by 
Quarterdeck on an early form of “Windows” technology.  See Patent Is Won by Quarterdeck, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 19, 1989, at D4 (suggesting, wrongly as it turns out, that it was “unusual” to receive a 
software patent and that the patent could be more important than Apple’s battle with Microsoft over 
copyright protection for its graphic user interface). 
50. For example, Donald Chisum argued vehemently that Benson needed to be explicitly 
overruled to clear the way for a sensible system of software patenting.  See Donald S. Chisum, The 
Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 961 (1986) (calling the Benson decision 
poorly reasoned and inconsistent with later case law).  On the other side of the issue, Pamela 
Samuelson argued in 1990 that the PTO had gone too far to tolerate software patents and that the 
courts needed to step in to prevent the proliferation of patents in the area.  See Samuelson, supra 
note 6, at 1029 (restating “the case against patent protection for algorithms”). 
51. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
52. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally 
divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
53. See Josh Lerner & Feng Zhu, What Is the Impact of Software Patent Shifts?: Evidence from 
Lotus v. Borland (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11168, 2005), available at 
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11168.pdf (examining the impact of the series of decisions leading to 
and including Lotus v. Borland, and presenting evidence that a reduction in copyright protection led 
to more patenting by interface firms). 
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the personal computer and then the Internet.54  This produced a rate of patent-
ing that was unimaginable to those in the industry just a few decades 
earlier.55 
To see how those factors changed the relative patenting rates among 
various types of software firms, we present in Figures 3 and 4 data on the 
patenting practices from 1990–2001 of three groups of large firms that sur-
vived throughout the entire period and now have substantial software 
patenting portfolios: electronics firms, prepackaged software firms, and 
system-design firms.56  As those figures illustrate (with alternate data on 
patents as a function of sales and as a function of R&D), electronics firms 
already had established stable patenting practices and thus experienced only 
a modest rise in patenting rates from 1990–2001, while the firms in the other 
two sectors, more focused on software, experienced an increase of 300%–
500%.  The point is illustrated more clearly in Figure 5, which shows the 
patenting rates for one prominent firm from each sector: HP’s line has only a 
slight upward trend, while the Microsoft and IBM lines show much steeper 
increases that are surprisingly parallel given the common perception that 
Microsoft is a relative latecomer to the patent sweepstakes. 
 
54. See David S. Evans & Bernard J. Reddy, Government Preferences for Promoting Open-
Source Software: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 313, 
321 (2003) (noting the favorable conditions that led to the increase in software patents during the 
1990s). 
55. See Kleinfield, supra note 28, at D6 (quoting Goetz’s comment that “[i]f the Patent Office 
were to become receptive to giving out patents on software, I doubt that there would be more than a 
few hundred applications a year”). 
56. The firms are distinguished by three-digit North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) codes: 334 for the electronics firms (Apple, EMC, HP, NCR, Qualcomm, and Sun), 511 
for the prepackaged software firms (Adobe, Autodesk, Computer Associates, Microsoft, Oracle, 
Sybase, and Synopsys), and 541 for the system-design and processing firms (EDS, IBM, Mentor 
Graphics, Novell, and Unisys). 
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Figure 3: Patent Applications per Billion Dollars in Sales 
(by Sector) (1990–2001) 
 
 
Figure 4: Patent Applications per Billion Dollars in R&D  
(by Sector) (1990–2001) 
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Figure 5: Patent Applications per Billion Dollars in Sales 
(by Firm) (1990–2001) 
 
 
Figure 6: Patent Applications per Billion Dollars in R&D 
(by Firm) (1990–2001) 
 
The data on patenting as a function of R&D is particularly illuminating, 
given the industry focus on the ratio of patenting to R&D dollars.57  Indeed, 
some researchers have become concerned that patents might be substituting 
 
57. See Randall Stross, Why Bill Gates Wants 3,000 New Patents, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005, at 
BU3 (attributing Microsoft’s conclusion that it was underpatenting to its comparatively low ratio of 
patents to R&D dollars). 
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for research expenditures.58  Others, however, have pointed out that patenting 
and R&D affect one another and are driven by similar factors.59 
What we do know (as illustrated by the descriptive data in Figures 2, 4, 
and 6 above) is that the propensity to patent in the industry increased rapidly 
during the early part of the 1990s.  It is evident, however, that the rapid up-
ward trend ended quite some time ago, perhaps by 1997.  Indeed, if the 
comparative charts suggest anything, it is that R&D expenditures as a func-
tion of sales have grown more rapidly in the prepackaged software sector 
than in the others. 
In general, however, none of this tells us whether firms are innovating 
more or less, or whether the patents are of a higher or lower quality.  Rather, 
these charts suggest that the firms in the industry, for the reasons discussed 
above, were steadily instituting processes to protect more of their technolo-
gies and protecting things that might be less “valuable” or less central to their 
existing products.  Thus, the shift in propensity to patent might reflect a con-
scious decision to protect more of the things that the firm has developed that 
are not yet marketed (and thus protected through secrecy).  In short, whereas 
firms in the 1980s patented their most fundamental and crucial technologies, 
the modern software firm with a patenting portfolio is likely to patent as a 
matter of routine.60 
III. Explaining the Pattern of Patents in the Modern Software Industry 
A. Introduction 
Turning from history to the modern software industry, what we see now 
is a complex pattern of software patenting influenced by features of the firm.  
Although the frequency of patenting is a major topic of public debate, little 
work has been done to explain the pattern of patenting.61  To be sure, the 
 
58. James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents 38–41 (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 03-17/R, 2004), available at http://www.researchon 
innovation.org/swpat.pdf (arguing that software patents substitute for R&D spending); see also 
Robert M. Hunt, When Do More Patents Reduce R&D?, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 87, 90 (2006) 
(“[F]irms that concentrated on obtaining software patents experienced a . . . significant decline in 
their R&D intensity, relative to other firms.”).  Bessen and Hunt published a portion of this article in 
James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. 
STRATEGY 157 (2007).  Two of us discuss some of the problems with their approach in Allison & 
Mann, supra note 7. 
59. Ashish Arora, Marco Ceccagnoli & Wesley M. Cohen, R&D and the Patent Premium 1 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9431, 2003), available at http://papers.nber. 
org/papers/w9431.pdf. 
60. Along the way, the industry has transitioned from one with a small number of relatively 
broad “pioneering patents” to one with a large number of narrow patents, which has caused 
justifiable concern about the transaction costs of licensing. 
61. Although the literature provides no definitive theoretical framework for predicting when 
patents will be useful, an article by Wesley Cohen and his coauthors takes steps toward a general 
explanation as part of a description of differences between the United States and Japan.  Wesley M. 
Cohen et al., R&D Spillovers, Patents, and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United 
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existing literature does recognize a rough cross-licensing equilibrium among 
the incumbent firms.62  Many of those firms have substantial patent 
portfolios, but a web of explicit or implicit cross-licensing agreements means 
that the major incumbents have access to most of the patented technologies 
in the industry.  Thus, those firms compete against each other, for the most 
part, on product design and marketing.  At this point, patent-based market 
power does not appear to be a significant factor. 
If the desire to build portfolios for defensive purposes were the main 
justification for patents in the industry, however, one would expect portfolios 
roughly proportionate to litigation exposure.  Assuming that the firm’s size is 
a reasonable proxy for litigation exposure, this suggests an easy quantitative 
inquiry.  Specifically, if the defensive portfolio hypothesis is correct, patent 
portfolios would correlate closely with size, and there would not be a great 
deal of variation tied to other factors such as market sector or R&D intensity. 
Because there are in fact notable differences in patenting practices in 
different sectors of the software industry,63 we expect that the pattern of pat-
enting will depend not only on size, but also on whether the firm focuses on 
selling products or services, how devoted the firm is to R&D (conventionally 
measured by R&D intensity, calculated as $R&D/employee), whether the 
firm is primarily a software firm or a hardware/electronics firm, and com-
petitive issues in the specific sector of the software industry in which the firm 
is located. 
To examine those questions, we combined patent data with data about 
firms in Software Magazine’s Software 500 from 1998–2002.64  Because we 
 
States, 31 RES. POL’Y 1349 (2002).  In their view, patents can play two distinct roles: as tools for 
exclusion (to be exploited through production within the patenting firm), and as tools for licensing 
(to be exploited through licensing outside the boundary of the patenting firm).  Id. at 1365.  They 
develop a distinction between “discrete” and “complex” products, finding evidence to support the 
idea that “complex” product industries in the United States rely more heavily on licensing to permit 
exploitation outside the boundaries of the firm.  Id. 
62. For a detailed discussion, see Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the 
Software Industry?, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 961, 990–92 (2005). 
63. See Mann & Sager, supra note 7, at 198–99 (finding a significant correlation between 
number of patents and software-industry subsector). 
64. The Software 500 ranks the top 500 firms in the software industry each year by software 
revenue.  The Software 500, SOFTWARE MAG., June 1999, at 32, 32.  Software Magazine collects 
information for the Software 500 from an annual vendor survey, public documents, press releases, 
SEC filings, and industry analysts.  Id.  Based on interviews within the industry, we have the 
impression that the survey response rate is quite high.  The list appears to be widely regarded as 
authoritative within the industry.  Campbell-Kelly, for example, uses the list pervasively in his 
comprehensive history of the industry.  See CAMPBELL-KELLY, supra note 41, passim.  Among 
other things, it is considerably more comprehensive than the “Softletter 100,” which is limited to 
prepackaged software providers and thus generally excludes services firms.  See Stewart J.H. 
Graham & David C. Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection in the U.S. Software Industry, in 
PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 219, 232–33 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. 
Merrill eds., 2003) (using the trade newsletter “Softletter 100” to identify trends in software 
patenting). 
 Because of considerable turnover in the industry, that list includes about 1,000 firms for the five-
year period.  For each firm, the Software 500 includes several data points of interest, total revenues, 
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are interested in the characteristics that relate to software patents, we divided 
the data set of 34,000 patents into software and nonsoftware patents.  The 
methodology was to examine the patents individually to determine whether 
each patent, properly speaking, should be considered a patent on a software 
invention.65  Using that methodology, about 68% (13,500) of the non-IBM 
patents and about 55% of the IBM patents (extrapolating from the sample 
that we examined), qualified as software patents for a blended total of about 
62% (21,200) of software patents.66  As Table 1 illustrates, the patents were 
highly concentrated—more than 80% of the firms had not even a single 
patent, and less than 10% had more than one patent. 
 
total revenues from software-related activities, percent of revenues expended on research and 
development, number of employees, and percent of revenues generated by the sale of services.  
Because the purpose of our study is to focus on firms that fairly can be characterized as software 
firms, we excluded the eighteen firms that did not derive at least 20% of their total revenues from 
software in any of the five years for which we collected data. 
65. Allison examined all of the patents except the patents for IBM and categorized each patent 
for which at least one claim element covered data processing as a software patent.  For the 14,000 
IBM patents, he read a random sample of 325 patents and extrapolated from that sample.  The 
distinction is a difficult one because there is no specific patent class for software patents.  Prior 
scholars have taken one of two approaches.  First, Graham and Mowery look at the portfolios of 
large prepackaged software firms and develop a set of classes that includes most of their patents.  
Graham & Mowery, supra note 64, at 220.  Second, Bessen and Hunt develop a keyword search 
designed to capture software patents.  Bessen & Hunt, supra note 58, at 8.  Although our approach 
arguably is more subjective, we believe that the increased accuracy makes it preferable.  For a more 
detailed explanation of our definition of a software patent and what we view as its superiority to 
other attempts to identify data sets of software patents, see Allison & Mann, supra note 7 
(manuscript at 8–14). 
66. To provide additional data points for robustness checks (as described below), we 
subsequently collected a set of all of the patents issued to the firms from January 1, 2003, through 
June 30, 2005 (an additional 20,000 patents), but we did not analyze those patents to determine 
whether they were software patents or not. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Patent Portfolios 
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We examined the variation in patenting by constructing a patent 
production function to identify the factors that might influence the number of 
patents a firm produces.67  Because we are interested in software patents, we 
estimated two sets of models: one using only software patents and a second 
using total patents.  The sections that follow report our findings on the five 
explanations discussed above: size, share of revenues from product licensing, 
R&D intensity, share of revenues from hardware sales, and industry sector. 
B. Analysis 
1. Patenting and Size.—As suggested above, it is natural to expect that 
patenting would correlate with size to some degree.  This might be true be-
cause of economies of scale in patenting, it might be true because larger 
firms are more likely to have matured to the stage where they can develop 
sophisticated patenting policies, or it might be true because larger firms are 
more likely to derive value from patents than smaller firms.  Or, it might 
simply relate to litigation exposure, as discussed above. 
Tables 2 and 3 summarize our analysis.  Table 2 presents the software 
patent model, and Table 3 presents the total patent model.  We report t-
statistics in parentheses after the coefficient.  Given its intuitive appeal, it is 
 
67. Our analysis is similar to that used in Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The 
Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 
1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2001).  Following Hall & Ziedonis, supra, and Jerry 
Hausman, Bronwyn H. Hall & Zvi Griliches, Econometric Models for Count Data with an 
Application to the Patents-R & D Relationship, 52 ECONOMETRICA 909 (1984), and Bessen & 
Hunt, supra note 58, we estimate our models using both Poisson and negative binomial 
distributional assumptions. 
 Similar to previous work, we assume that the number of patents applied for in a year is a 
function of a firm’s R&D spending and other characteristics of the firm.  The subscript i denotes the 
firm, and the subscript t denotes the year.  The number of patents produced by firm i at time t is 
denoted by the variable yit.  We assume that the number of patents is a function of observable and 
unobservable factors.  The primary estimates in this Article assume that the unobserved component 
has a Poisson distribution.  Under the Poisson distribution assumption the expectation of yit takes 
the form: 
)exp()( βitit xy =∑ .  
 The expectation of the model is a function of observed exogenous variables xit and a vector of 
parameters β.  The parameters of the model are estimated using maximum likelihood.  We note here 
an important feature of our analysis.  In general, a maximum likelihood model will not be consistent 
unless the distributional assumption of the model is correct.  However, C. Gourieroux, A. Montfort 
& A. Trognon, Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Methods: Application to Poisson Models, 52 
ECONOMETRICA 701, 701 (1984) show that if the mean of the above equation is correctly specified, 
then the estimate of β will be consistent even if the data rejects the Poisson distributional 
assumption.  The standard errors must be corrected to be robust to alternative distributions.  This is 
important because the assumption that the variance of the Poisson model is equal to the mean is 
restrictive and often (as with the data here) incorrect in practice, typically when the excess of the 
variance over the mean reflects “overdispersion.”  We discuss in detail below how we have 
addressed the problems in matching the distributional assumptions of those models to the 
characteristics of this data set. 
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not surprising that size is relevant, measured by log(Employee).68  That 
variable has a stable sign (positive) and a stable magnitude (slightly more 
than one in all four models), and is statistically and economically significant 
in each of the four models.  Because the variable is a log transformation of 
the raw employee data, the coefficient should be interpreted as a constant 
elasticity.  For instance, all other things held constant, the coefficient of 1.17 
in Column 1 of Table 2 on log(Employee) implies that a 10.0% increase in 
the number of employees causes an 11.7% increase in the number of soft-
ware patents.69  Because this coefficient is slightly more than one, it suggests 
that returns to scale in number of employees are approximately constant in 
the software industry.  In other words, other things held equal, firms patent in 
proportion to their size, so that if the number of employees is doubled, we 
would expect the firm to produce slightly more than twice the number of 
patents. 
 
Table 2: Propensity to Produce Software Patents 
 
 
 
68. Because of the skewed distribution, we regress log(Employee) rather than the raw data on 
number of employees. 
69. This result is slightly higher, but comparable to other results found in the literature, 
including Hall & Ziedonis’s calculation of a coefficient of 0.989 in the semiconductor industry.  See 
Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 67, at 116 tbl.1.  It also is slightly higher than Bessen and Hunt’s 
calculation of a coefficient of 0.880 in the production of software patents by firms that are for the 
most part outside the software industry.  See Bessen & Hunt, supra note 58, at 50 tbl.5. 
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Table 3: Propensity to Produce Patents 
 
 
 
The size of the coefficient sheds light on the relation between size and 
patenting practices.  For example, if the acquisition of patents were substan-
tially more attractive for larger firms than for smaller firms, the coefficient 
would be substantially greater than one.70  If the acquisition of patents were 
substantially more attractive for smaller firms than for larger firms, the coef-
ficient would be substantially less than one because the size of the portfolio 
would not increase as quickly as the size of the firm.  Because the coefficient 
is so close to one, it seems likely that the other variables in our model have 
captured the size-related reasons why patents have different utilities for 
firms. 
2. Products and Services.—The most promising explanation for the 
variation in patenting practices, drawn from the management literature, 
 
70. The absence of a large coefficient here seems to be in tension with the predictions of 
Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner about the relative importance of patenting for large 
firms.  See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 55 
(2005) (“For large firms, a major driver of patenting behavior is the need to create substantial patent 
portfolios—independent of the expected values of any particular individual patents.”). 
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focuses on a continuum from products firms to services firms.71  Firms that 
sell software products generally have higher operating margins, higher 
growth rates, and less stable market shares, whereas services firms generally 
have lower operating margins and lower growth rates, but can more readily 
establish stable market positions.72  Thus, a products firm such as Microsoft 
will have high volume sales of noncustomized products that customers can 
use “off the shelf” with little or no assistance, and a typical services firm 
such as EDS will generate revenues by helping firms to install, design, and 
maintain software.  The products model is relatively more effective for 
venture-backed start-ups than the services model.  Because products firms 
can “scale,” i.e., achieve economies of scale, more easily than services firms, 
successful products firms are more likely to produce the high returns venture 
capital investors seek.  There also are a large number of hybrid firms like 
Oracle.  Some of those firms began by attempting to sell products, but later 
were forced by market conditions to provide increasing levels of 
customization, thus degrading their ability to sell high volumes of a pure 
high-margin product.  To get a sense for the variation, Figure 7 displays the 
differing shares of revenues attributable to product licensing for five of the 
largest software firms.73 
 
Figure 7: Products Revenue Share for Leading Software Firms in 2002 
 
 
71. See MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO, THE BUSINESS OF SOFTWARE 25–26 (2004) (describing a 
products firm as one that makes the majority of its revenues by volume sales of software packages, 
while services firms customize products for each customer and provide training, maintenance, and 
technical support). 
72. See id. 
73. Although accounting practices might differ slightly, product licensing encompasses the fees 
generated from software products and excludes services revenue related to maintenance, support, 
consulting, and the like. 
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Given the obvious difference in appropriation strategies, the products–
services distinction provides a useful lens for exploring the apparent disparity 
of patenting practices in the industry.  Patents seem likely to be a relatively 
more effective tool for protecting innovation in products than in services.  To 
the extent a firm can provide a unique level of skilled services, it may be fea-
sible to maintain much of the differentiating knowledge in a tacit form, 
bound up with the skills of the individual employees.  Conversely, a products 
firm that sends its product out into the marketplace in many instances will be 
vulnerable to appropriation by competitors.74  If so, a patent that permits a 
firm to fence out competitors will have considerably more value to a prod-
ucts firm than to a services firm.  This, in turn, suggests the hypothesis that 
products firms, because their technology is more difficult to protect than the 
technology of services firms, will produce more patents than services firms, 
all other things being equal. 
Because the Services variable is a fraction of software revenues, and 
because our hypothesis is that the devotion of the firm to a products model 
should relate positively to the firm’s propensity to patent innovations related 
to software, the results in Table 2 should provide the clearest test of our pri-
mary hypothesis, with Table 3 primarily relevant as a robustness check.  In 
Table 2, the Services variable is negative and significantly related to the de-
pendent variable in all of the different runs.  The impact of the Services 
variable on the number of patents also appears to be economically 
significant.  For example, referring to the base (Poisson) model in Column 1, 
the coefficient suggests that a 1.0% increase in the percentage of software 
sales coming from services (e.g., percentage of sales increasing from 50.0% 
to 51.0%), implies a 2.3% decrease in the number of patents produced.75  A 
more extreme result suggests that the magnitude of the Services variable is 
also economically significant.  A firm that derives all its revenues from 
products (e.g., Service = 0%) is expected to produce 230% more patents than 
a firm entirely devoted to providing services (e.g., Service = 100%). 
These findings are robust.  For example, the sign and general magnitude 
of the coefficient were stable in a model (reported in Column 2 of Table 2) 
 
74. See Mann, supra note 62, at 985 (noting that many companies cannot reap the rewards of 
excluding competitors unless they can survive to a stage where they are profiting from their own 
exploitation of a product); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection 
of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2333–39 (1994) (explaining that much of the 
value of software is in its surface design that is “prominently displayed by the program in 
operation,” and “[a]ny product that bears a large quantum of its know-how on its face is vulnerable 
to rapid imitative copying because this know-how cannot be kept secret”). 
75. Although the goodness-of-fit test rejects the Poisson distributional assumption, we 
nevertheless report the results of this analysis, following prior statistical practice.  See Gourieroux, 
Montfort & Trognon, supra note 67.  As recommended there, we use heteroscedastic-consistent 
standard errors to calculate t-statistics.  The goodness of fit test is based on the deviance statistic.  
The standard error estimates used to compute the t-statistics are robust to heteroscedasticity and 
misspecification of the distribution.  To account for the multiple observations of some firms and the 
consequent possibility of autocorrelation, the standard errors are clustered. 
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using a negative binomial distributional assumption instead of our base 
Poisson assumption.76  The parallel runs using total patents as the dependent 
variable, reported in Table 3, are similar.77  Most importantly (as summarized 
in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2), we also estimated a series of models that 
include sector-specific fixed effects to control for differences in the propen-
sity to patent across different sectors in the software industry.78  Inclusion of 
the sector-fixed effects is important for two reasons.79  First, the estimates in 
Columns 1 and 2 do not indicate whether the Services variable is capturing 
different propensities to patent that relate to differences between sectors, or 
whether the product–services distinction is also important within sectors.  
Inclusion of the sector-specific fixed effects along with the Services variable 
focuses the test of the Services variable.  Specifically, this model shows that 
the products–services distinction is important within sectors. 
The results of the Poisson model and the negative binomial model both 
indicate that the Services variable continues to be negative as well as 
statistically and economically significant.  What this suggests is that the 
devotion of a firm to a products or services model is important, even within a 
particular sector.  Thus, the data do not suggest simply that some sectors of 
the industry rely more on products and some more on services or that those 
differences can explain levels of patenting activity.  Rather, the data suggest 
important differences along the products–services continuum, even within 
particular sectors.  To be sure, the magnitude of the coefficients on the 
Services variable does drop considerably (from 0.023 and 0.040 to 0.015 and 
0.020, respectively), but this merely suggests that sector differences capture a 
portion of the difference in patenting activity.80 
 
76. We use a negative binomial model because the goodness of fit test suggested that our data is 
overdispersed.  The negative binomial model is consistent only if the true distribution is negative 
binomial; however, if this is the true specification, then the estimate is more efficient than the 
Poisson model.  Referring to Column 2 of Table 2, the parameter alpha is the overdispersion 
parameter.  The high t-statistic, indicating that alpha is significantly different from zero, indicates 
that overdispersion remains even in the negative binomial model. 
77. This has the advantage of having more data points (because we can use the additional 
20,000 patents from 2003–2005), but it has the disadvantage that we must analyze total patents 
rather than software patents (because we have not divided the later patents into software and 
nonsoftware patents).  In any event, those runs produced results and coefficients similar to those set 
out in Table 2. 
78. We test the joint statistical significance of the sector-specific fixed effects by using a 
likelihood ratio test based on the selected sample.  For both models, we reject the null hypothesis 
that the sector-specific fixed effects have no explanatory power at the 95% confidence level. 
79. Inclusion of sector-specific fixed effects necessitates dropping several observations from 
the analysis.  Sectors that have no patents are excluded from the analysis because the sector-specific 
fixed effects entirely explain the number of patents in those sectors.  In addition, the sector category 
marked “other” is also excluded because it does not represent any particular sector.  The sector-
specific-fixed-effect estimates are based on the remaining 612 observations from the 445 remaining 
firms. 
80. In separate runs that we do not report here in detail, we attempted to analyze the differences 
in patent production functions for products and services firms.  See Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 67, 
at 119 (using similar analysis for semiconductor firms).  Although our analysis strongly rejects the 
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We emphasize the ambiguity of causation in this finding.  On the one 
hand, it might well be that firms have a higher propensity to patent because 
they are products firms, either because of the greater ability of those patents 
to protect innovation in products or because of the greater need to protect 
innovation that is disclosed through the distribution of products.  Conversely, 
it might well be that a patenting culture in a firm’s early days could contrib-
ute to its survival as a products firm.  Referring back to Figures 1 and 2, the 
most dominant products firms (Microsoft and Adobe, with 100% and 99% 
products revenue shares) were among the earliest prepackaged software firms 
to start patenting, while the three late patentees shown in those figures sur-
vive today as the most prominent hybrid firm (Oracle, with a 35% products 
revenue share) and as two of the largest services firms (Autodesk and 
Computer Associates, with 0% products revenue shares).  It is at least 
possible to believe that the late patenting strategies of those firms under-
mined their competitive position in products markets and forced their retreat 
into the realm of nonproducts firms. 
3. Patenting and R&D Intensity.—The next possibility is that a firm’s 
R&D intensity affects its production of patents.  Specifically, assuming that 
the firm has the same number of employees, the same share of products–
services revenues, and is in the same sector in the industry, will the number 
of patents relate to the intensity of R&D investment (measured by dollars of 
R&D investment per employee)?  The discussion in Part II regarding the in-
crease in the number of patents as a function of R&D strongly suggests that 
R&D intensity is important.  Not surprisingly, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that 
R&D intensity does explain an important portion of the variation in patenting 
rates. 
Like the previous variables, R&D intensity has a stable sign (positive) 
and a coefficient that is both statistically and economically significant.  
Specifically, the elasticity of R&D intensity on patenting is 0.89.  Again, this 
is similar to the results found by Bessen and Hunt of 1.01.81  However, these 
estimates are much larger than results in the semiconductor industry of 0.18 
 
possibility that the patent production functions are the same, it is not easy to interpret our findings 
about how they differ.  For example, we found that the elasticity of software patent production with 
respect to R&D intensity is greater for products firms and services firms and that the elasticity of 
software patent production with respect to employees is greater for services firms than for products 
firms.  On the other hand, looking at the elasticity of total patent production, we find that services 
firms have a greater elasticity for both R&D intensity and employees than products firms.  Neither 
of those differences, however, is significant.  Our tentative inclination is to accept the results related 
to software patent production, concluding that the greater heterogeneity in our data set on total 
patents makes it less useful for analyzing the factors related to patent production. 
81. Bessen & Hunt, supra note 58, at 19.  Bessen and Hunt find different results when 
accounting for firm-level heterogeneity using fixed effects.  Id.  However, their fixed-effect 
estimation excludes firms with zero patents.  Id.  Such firms include a majority of firms in this 
Article and in the Bessen and Hunt article.  Therefore, we compare the basic Poisson regressions as 
these include all firms and are less prone to sample-selection bias. 
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found by Hall and Ziedonis.82  Generally, this suggests that although the ef-
fects of size in the software industry are about the same as those in the 
semiconductor industry, the effect of R&D intensity on software patenting is 
quite a bit greater than its effect on semiconductor patenting. 
4. Patenting and Hardware Revenues.—Another possibility we 
attempted to test is that hardware or systems firms will have different 
patenting strategies than pure software firms.  This hypothesis is drawn from 
the common suggestion in interviews with software executives that the typi-
cal hardware firm has a culture that is different from that of the typical 
software firm: the typical hardware-firm culture emphasizes institutions that 
facilitate patenting; the typical software-firm culture resists those 
institutions.83  Because the hypothesis here relates to the overall patenting 
philosophy of the firm, the hypothesis is tested more directly with the data on 
total patents in Table 3. 
The results here are markedly less robust than for the other variables.  
The relevant variable for this question is Fraction Software Sales.  As Table 
3 displays, the results range from marginal statistical significance (in the 
Poisson model) to no significance in the other models.  The coefficient is 
also quite small, though usually with the negative sign that the hypothesis 
suggests (indicating that firms with higher shares of revenues from software 
rather than other lines of business are likely to have fewer patents than firms 
with lower shares of revenue from software sales).84 
What is most interesting about those results is the small coefficient, 
which suggests that any distinction between the patenting practices of pure 
software firms and firms with substantial nonsoftware revenues is slight.  In 
light of the history summarized in Part II, this suggests that by the time our 
data were collected, the cultural resistance to patenting in the software in-
dustry had lost much of its force.  Even if there is a slight lingering 
distinction, patenting already had become as routine for software firms as it 
had long been for hardware firms. 
5. Patenting and Software Sectors.—The final variable we considered 
was the relation between industry sectors and patenting propensities.  As dis-
cussed above, differences among the widely heterogeneous sectors in the 
software industry may explain some of the differences in patenting practices 
between firms.  The question remains, in light of the sections above, whether 
our more general variables capture the reasons for patenting variations 
 
82. Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 67, at 116 tbl.1. 
83. See Mann, supra note 62, at 982–85 (discussing concerns that an emphasis on patenting will 
divert a firm’s focus from product development). 
84. We have also run a number of robustness checks.  These include not only the Table 2 
models analyzing software patenting rates (rather than total patenting rates), but also checks that 
include a number of outliers with very large portfolios, a random-effect Poisson estimate with 
sector-specific fixed effects, and firm-level fixed effects.  Those results are similar to those we 
report in the text. 
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between sectors.  The problem in using the “Software 500” sector 
designations is that Software Magazine, during the period for which we col-
lected data, used more than 100 different sector designations, many of which 
include very few firms.  Accordingly, we constructed a modified set of sec-
toral designations, which consolidates the Software 500’s designations into 
“only” 36 sectors.85  Table 4 below lists the different sectors and provides 
basic descriptive statistics for the firms in each sector. 
 
Table 4: Software Sector Descriptive Statistics (1998 and 1999) 
 
 
 
The variation in the median of size and service revenue underscores the 
heterogeneity of the sectors.  For example, the median data-warehousing firm 
has about 5,000 employees, while the median disaster-recovery firm has only 
38.  Similarly, the typical data-warehousing firm derives only 12% of its 
revenues from services, while the median retail-applications firm derives 
74% of its revenues from services. 
Of particular import for our work is the variation in patenting practices, 
with quite a number of reasonably well-populated sectors entirely devoid of 
patents (human-resources software, for example), and others in which 
 
85. A good deal of our consolidation reflected collapsing different designations used from year 
to year for similar firms. 
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substantial portfolios exist (operating-systems and systems-integration 
services, for example, with an average of more than forty patents per firm).  
Table 5 presents a more rigorous examination of that question—a sector-
fixed effect analysis designed to illustrate the particular effects on patenting 
propensity of each of the sectors.  As you would expect given the discussion 
above, Table 5 illustrates stark differences among sectors that are not cap-
tured by the other variables. 
Perhaps the most interesting point from that table is the apparent 
relation between concentration in a particular sector and patenting 
propensity.  As Figure 8 illustrates, the sectors with the highest propensities 
to patent have fewer firms per sector than the sectors with moderate or low 
propensities to patent.  It is difficult to be sure why industry concentration 
would relate to patenting propensity.  One possibility suggested by Cockburn 
and MacGarvie is that the presence of substantial patent portfolios may deter 
further entry into the sector.86  Another possibility is that weaker firms disap-
pear as sectors mature.  If substantial portfolios are a feature of relatively 
mature firms, we would expect mature sectors to have a smaller number of 
firms with greater average rates of patenting.  The breakdown of sectors in 
Table 5 provides some support for this possibility. 
 
Figure 8: Patenting Rates and Sector Concentration 
 
 
86. See Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 7, at 33 (“Controlling for the characteristics of the 
firm and market, we find that software firms are less likely to enter product markets in which there 
are more patents.”).  One problem with that explanation, at least with respect to Cockburn and 
MacGarvie’s data, is that they analyze entry in any given year as a function of existing patent 
portfolios.  But most venture-backed software start-ups do not obtain patents until after several 
years of operation.  Accordingly, a sector in which several firms already have strong portfolios is 
likely to be a sector of relatively mature technology.  It should be no surprise that the rate of entry 
will slow in such a sector, but it is just as likely attributable to the head-start and first-mover 
advantages of the existing firms as it is to the exclusive force of the patents held by the existing 
firms. 
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Table 5: Sector Fixed-Effect Analysis 
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Fitting this together, three points warrant emphasis.  First, although pat-
enting does relate to the size of the firm, the pattern is complex, with other 
variables explaining important parts of the picture.  Second, the variables that 
are most successful in explaining patenting variations are the variables that 
explain the firm’s particular niche within the software industry—the distinc-
tion between products and services is central, but the extent to which a firm 
has nonsoftware business lines is not important.  Third, although we have not 
emphasized it above, it is interesting that the results in Table 2 are so similar 
to the results in Table 3.  Given the common anecdotal impression that soft-
ware patents can be much less effective at appropriating the value of 
innovation than hardware patents,87 we would have expected the patent 
production functions for software patents and total patents to differ 
substantially.  The similarity of those functions suggests, again, that the use 
of software patents is converging rapidly with the use of patents in adjacent 
sectors. 
IV. The Role of Patents in Software Development 
A complete picture of the software industry cannot be limited to 
incumbent firms.  As others have recognized, the industry experiences high 
rates of new entry and turnover among firms of all sizes.88  Much of the rea-
son for this phenomenon is that a great deal of the new technology in the 
industry is developed not by incumbent firms in the first instance, but rather 
by one of three development channels that are distinct from the incumbent 
firms: venture-backed firms, open-source development, and independent 
inventors.89  As they do for the incumbent firms, patents play a distinct role 
in the success of firms from each of those channels. 
A. The Venture-Backed Start-up Channel 
The first and most prominent channel is the venture-backed start-up 
channel.90  In this channel, venture capital firms serve as investment 
intermediaries, providing capital and management expertise to young firms 
seeking to make their way into the industry.91  This channel, of course, has 
 
87. See Mann, supra note 62, at 980 n.102 (presenting anecdotal evidence that software 
executives view software patents as generally easier to work around and less useful than hardware 
patents). 
88. See Merges, supra note 7, at 7 (finding that turnover rates in the software industry are 
comparably higher than many other industries).  For a quantitative analysis, see Cockburn & 
MacGarvie, supra note 7, at 16–17, 49 fig.2 (describing and plotting the turnover rates in software 
markets). 
89. The channels are not mutually exclusive.  For example, there are a number of open-source 
venture-backed start-ups, and smaller venture-backed start-ups may resemble independent inventors 
in many respects.  See Mann, supra note 20, at 13 (finding more than 100 open-source firms in the 
United States in which there has been venture capital investment). 
90. This subpart draws heavily on Mann & Sager, supra note 7. 
91. Id. at 193. 
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produced many of the most prominent success stories, with Google providing 
the most salient recent example.92  As mentioned in Part III, venture 
financing tends to favor products firms, primarily because successful 
products firms are much more capable of achieving economies of scale 
(“scaling”) quickly than services firms.93  Because the quick ability to scale 
relates closely to the ability of venture capitalists to obtain the return they 
seek on their investments, this model tends to work much better for products 
firms. 
Patents do play an important role for start-up firms.  As one of us has 
explained previously, patents provide little benefit to the early stage prereve-
nue start-up firm.94  But as the firm matures and begins to develop revenue 
streams, patents become increasingly important.95  The reason can be that the 
firm needs the patents to prevent larger firms from copying its products.  The 
reason also can be that the patents will be important to investors as the firm’s 
financing needs increase.  Or it might be that the patent signals something 
about the firm’s sophistication or management acumen.  Whatever the 
reason, however, interviews with investors and entrepreneurs strongly 
suggest that patents can be important for venture-backed software start-ups.96  
The perspective is not unanimous.  Many, if not most, investors recognize the 
limited value that patents have for appropriating the value of a software 
innovation, and thus, they worry about how their portfolio firms will defend 
a market share even if their firms can develop a significant product.97 
That perspective is buttressed by the available data about the role of 
patents in venture-backed start-ups.  Although only about 25% of venture-
backed firms obtain patents,98 there is a close relation between the acquisition 
 
92. See JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES 
OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 89 (2005) (recounting how Google obtained 
millions of dollars in venture capital funds). 
93. For the same reason, computer and peripheral firms are not as readily suited to venture 
capital investment.  For example, the PricewaterhouseCoopers National Venture Capital 
Association MoneyTree Report lists 869 software investments for $4.8 billion for 2005.  See 
PricewaterhouseCoopers & National Venture Capital Association, MoneyTree Report, 
http://www.pwcmoneytree.com/moneytree/nav.jsp?page=historical (select “Software” in the “Select 
Industry” drop-down menu).  But the report shows only sixty-one investments in computer and 
peripheral firms, which total only $500 million for the same year.  See id. (select “Computer and 
Peripherals” in the “Select Industry” drop-down menu). 
94. See Mann, supra note 62, at 981 (summarizing findings of why developing patents are not 
so effective in the early stages of a firm). 
95. See Mann & Sager, supra note 7, at 202 (“[There is] some support for the hypothesis that 
the value of patents for software startups first becomes significant as they reach the stage at which 
they begin to generate revenues.”). 
96. Mann, supra note 62, at 981–82. 
97. Id. at 978–79. 
98. Mann & Sager, supra note 7, at 205.  The share of firms with patents in this venture-backed 
data set is higher than the share of firms with patents in the Software 500 data set described in Part 
III.  This is true, presumably, because the venture-backed data set includes a smaller share of 
services firms.  See id. (noting that products firms are much more common in the venture-backed 
data set). 
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of patents and the progress of firms through the venture capital cycle.  Thus, 
for example, firms with patents are likely to obtain more financing, and they 
are more likely to succeed.99  In general, the relevance of patents to mature 
and successful portfolio firms is consistent with the discussion at the end of 
Part II.  As these firms mature, patenting becomes a routine part of the firm’s 
operations, just as it has been for many software incumbents for the last 
decade. 
For our purposes, the exit strategy is what is most important about the 
venture-backed start-up channel.  Generally, the venture-backed start-up that 
develops a successful product will exit from its start-up status in one of two 
ways.  First, it might obtain sufficient funds (generally from public investors) 
to become a large firm, ascending to the ranks of the incumbent firms in the 
industry (like Google).100  Alternatively (perhaps much more commonly), it 
might sell its technology (normally through a sale of the entire firm) to one 
of the large incumbent firms.101 
What is most unlikely to happen is litigation—rare is the start-up firm 
that exploits its technology through patent litigation against a large incum-
bent firm.102  Although economic theory suggests that it often is difficult for 
one firm to transfer valuable information to another (Arrow’s information 
paradox103), the venture-backed channel avoids that difficulty.  Most 
obviously, the parties in control of mature venture-backed portfolio firms are 
a small class of venture capitalists, often previously employed at large in-
cumbent firms.  Thus, it is easy to expect that those people would have 
personal relations that would enhance their ability to make credible repre-
sentations about technology and come to consensual arrangements for 
acquisition of the start-up.  Similarly, the entrepreneurs themselves, to the 
extent they have any control over the process, are likely to be repeat players, 
worried about future transactions, and also former employees of incumbent 
firms themselves.  It is easy to see why successful start-ups often are 
 
99. With respect to financing, firms with patents obtain a median of four rounds rather than 
three, worth $26 million rather than $15 million.  Id. at 199 tbl.4.  Moreover, within five years of 
first financing, 13% of the firms with patents go public and only 4% fail.  Conversely, 3% of the 
firms without patents will have gone public by that point in time and 8% will fail.  Id.  As reported 
in more detail in Mann and Sager’s article, all of those distinctions are statistically significant and 
stable across a series of checks for robustness.  Id. 
100. See id. at 202 & tbl.3 (finding that 5% of the firms in the venture-backed data set had gone 
public). 
101. See id. (finding that 10% of the firms in the venture-backed data set had been acquired). 
102. See Mann, supra note 62, at 981–82 (observing that it is unlikely that an early-stage 
company that has a patent would have the resources to enforce the patent against a large firm).  
Licensing of technology from start-ups does happen occasionally, though it is rarely the preferred 
business model of the venture capitalist.  See id. at 982–83 (relating concerns among investors and 
developers that an overemphasis on licensing can degrade firm culture by diverting focus from 
product development).  Rather, it is a strategy to which the firm turns when it is unable to execute 
its chosen path. 
103. See Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 
2225, 2267–68 (1999) (discussing Arrow’s information paradox). 
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acquired by incumbent firms and why litigation to enforce IP against 
incumbent firms is rarely the chosen strategy. 
B. The Open-Source Channel 
The open-source channel has gained prominence in recent years as 
programs like Linux, Apache, and Firefox have been broadly accepted.104  
With its roots in the hacker mythology of the early days of the Internet, the 
open-source community venerates a decentralized style of software devel-
opment that is the antithesis of the large bureaucratized incumbent firm. 
In the last decade, the open-source community has undergone a 
profound change.  At the same time as its products have become sufficiently 
successful to gain widespread use in large enterprises, the community’s de-
velopment processes have been adopted by some large incumbent technology 
firms—a few from the software industry (like IBM and Novell) but mostly 
from adjacent hardware industries (firms like Intel, HP, and Fujitsu).105  
Thus, the commercially successful open-source programs share the salient 
characteristic that they benefit from extensive financial support from large 
incumbent firms.106  The firms making those investments have done so as 
part of a “value-chain” strategy, in which the firms seek to commoditize a 
part of a value chain in which they are unlikely to dominate (like the operat-
ing system), hoping to extract value at some other part of a value chain (like 
the servers on which the operating system runs, the middleware that runs on 
the stack above the operating system, or the services necessary to assemble 
all of those pieces into a well-designed “solution”).107 
As the software has become commercialized, an increasing number of 
purely open-source firms have appeared.108  For the most part, the largest of 
these firms depend on sales of services.109  Because open-source software can 
be copied and sold freely by competitors, it is difficult to profit directly from 
product licensing.110  Accordingly, service companies dominate this 
market.111  The recent battle between Oracle and Red Hat illustrates this 
point—Oracle apparently plans to copy Red Hat’s version of Linux, 
presumably so that Oracle can profit from licensing products and providing 
 
104. See Mann, supra note 20, at 9–10, 11 n.43 (noting that the quality and free dissemination 
of Linux, Apache, and Firefox have led to their increased use). 
105. See id. at 24 (noting that these firms invest substantially in the development of Linux). 
106. See id. at 12 (discussing the ties between open-source communities and incumbent firms). 
107. Id. at 24–25. 
108. See id. at 13–14 (discussing the proliferation of venture-backed open-source firms). 
109. See id. at 34 (observing that the open-source model better suits services firms than 
products firms). 
110. See id. at 22 (noting that the open-source model makes it impractical to prevent third 
parties from exploiting the results of research). 
111. Id. at 34–35. 
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services related to Linux installations.112  The relative disutility of patents for 
services firms together with the communitarian philosophy discussed above 
makes it unsurprising that there are few patents held by open-source firms. 
Still, patents and other IP rights are crucial to the success of those 
strategies in several ways.  Most obviously, the incumbent firms use IP to 
protect their positions in those parts of the value chain where they plan to 
compete.  Thus, for example, although IBM has participated generously in 
the development of Linux and Apache, and has given the community ready 
access to the patents relevant to those projects, it has not abandoned the IP 
strategy that protects its investment in its server lines or software products 
like WebSphere.113  Also, to the extent that open-source communities are 
protected from patent litigation, it is because they operate under the umbrella 
of implicit promises of protection from the large patent-holding incumbents 
that support their communities.114 
To be sure, major parts of the open-source community find these 
developments unsatisfying.  The Free Software Foundation (FSF) led by 
Richard Stallman and Eben Moglen, for example, regularly decries the vice 
of patenting software.115  Its revisions of the GPL—the license under which 
Linux currently is distributed—reflect a continuing hostility to the increasing 
role that patents are playing in the industry.116  But on this point it is increas-
ingly clear that the FSF no longer speaks for the community as a whole.  
Thus we see that Linus Torvalds has expressed great dissatisfaction with the 
FSF’s position on these issues.117  This is because Torvalds is more con-
cerned about wide deployment and use of Linux.118  Patent-related revisions 
to the GPL that make it less congenial to the large firms that participate in the 
Linux project are in tension with that concern. 
C. The Independent Inventor Channel 
The third channel is the independent inventor.  This channel is the most 
controversial and least susceptible to generalization.  Here, we make three 
points.  First, this channel arguably plays a distinct role in providing valuable 
innovation in the industry.  Second, independent inventors are likely to 
 
112. For discussion of the Oracle strategy, see, for example, Stephen Shankland, Oracle Has 
Yet to Prove Linux Cred, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 27, 2006, http://news.com.com/Oracle+has+yet+ 
to+prove+Linux+cred/2100-7344_3-6130071.html. 
113. Mann, supra note 20, at 26. 
114. See id. at 29 (noting that IBM, Sun, and Nokia have issued promises not to enforce their 
patents). 
115. See supra note 8. 
116. See Mann, supra note 20, at 20 (describing GPLv3, which prohibits an entity from using 
its own modification of open-source software if that entity attempts to patent that modification). 
117. See Charles Babcock, Torvalds on the Cost of GPL 3, INFORMATIONWEEK, Mar. 19, 
2007, at 40 (reporting Torvalds’ position that the revisions of the GPL will reduce the simplicity of 
the previous version and unduly restrict what users can do with GPL software). 
118. See id. (noting that Torvalds will not move the license commitment for the Linux kernel to 
GPLv3). 
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struggle more than other potential new entrants in transferring technology to 
incumbent firms.  Third, building on the first two points, the market response 
is the creation of intermediaries to facilitate technology transfers between 
inventors and incumbents.  Although the business models of the intermedi-
aries are diverse, they generally describe themselves as patent acquisition or 
management firms and have been labeled pejoratively as “trolls.”119  
Generally, those firms exhibit a variety of different strategies that respond to 
the various shortcomings that will hinder independent inventors attempting to 
exploit their software-related inventions. 
1. The Role of Independent Inventors.—The first point is a relatively 
subjective one, though nonetheless significant.  Although often vilified in the 
media as a novel and radical phenomenon, Part II documents the important 
challenge that independent inventors have presented to incumbents from the 
earliest days of the industry.  Indeed, despite the rhetoric that characterizes 
the “troll” as an artifact of the rise of the Federal Circuit and related recent 
events,120 the inventor that received what often is regarded as the first soft-
ware patent, more than three decades ago, used his early patents to bolster 
efforts to create one of the first software products to enter into serious com-
petition with the “free software” that IBM was then bundling with its 
mainframe computers.121 
In the current milieu, industry sources (both in large firms and in patent 
acquisition firms) accept the notion that independent inventors in the 
software industry often have focused on larger “big picture” inventions while 
inventors at incumbent firms have largely focused on incremental improve-
ments to existing product lines.  Even at firms like Microsoft, with a 
corporate culture consciously directed toward forward-thinking innovation, 
the ever urgent need to protect and upgrade the firm’s core product lines 
makes it hard for researchers to do truly basic research about products that 
cannot be deployed in the near term.122 
 
119. E.g., Joe Beyers, Perspective: Rise of the Patent Trolls, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 12, 2005, 
http://news.com.com/rise+of+the+patent+trolls/2010-1071_3-5892996.html; see also John M. 
Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 2111, 2135 (2007) 
(“[U]nder current legal and economic conditions, nonpracticing or otherwise noncompeting patent 
holders [so-called trolls] might be at least as likely to be undercompensated as to be 
overcompensated.”).  But see James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An 
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 189–
90 (2006) (demonstrating how “trolls” as market intermediaries provide liquidity, market clearing, 
and increased efficiency to patent markets—the same benefits that securities dealers provide to 
capital markets). 
120. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The “Dubious 
Preponderance,” 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 924 (2004) (connecting the success of “patent 
trolls” to the Federal Circuit’s presumption of patent validity). 
121. Goetz, supra note 13, at 50–53. 
122. Henry Chesbrough’s book OPEN INNOVATION (2006) provides detailed and perceptive 
documentation of the difficulties that incumbent high-tech firms have faced in their efforts to foster 
successfully innovative environments within the boundaries of their own companies. 
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Similarly, venture-backed start-ups necessarily have a short time 
horizon because the financing model contemplates success or failure in a 
relatively short time—typically less than a decade.123  That financing model 
may be excellent for certain types of innovations, but the lesson of the dis-
cussion of venture-backed start-ups in the previous part is that the constraints 
of the venture capital model leave many valuable research opportunities un-
funded. 
At first glance, it might seem hard to put much weight on the distinction 
between independent invention and open-source development—apparently 
the essence of independence.  And it surely is true that a grassroots strain of 
open-source development persists; the development evidenced by the thou-
sands of small independent projects registered at SourceForge.124  But 
historically the path to market traction (and funding) for open-source tech-
nology has been distinct from the independent inventor channel discussed in 
this section.  As discussed above, the open-source projects that have gained 
substantial market traction ordinarily have succeeded through their adoption 
directly into the value chains of large incumbent firms.125  It is also fair to say 
that the key to open-source success has been quality of execution coupled 
with easy interoperability.  Linux and Apache were not visionary advances; 
they were high-quality solutions to pressing and immediate programming 
needs.  In general, then, open-source development has not (so far at least) 
provided the path breaking advances at which independent inventors aim. 
2. Difficulties of Commercialization for Independent Inventors.—
Several overlapping structural considerations make it natural to expect that 
independent inventors might make valuable discoveries in the industry yet 
face substantial obstacles that complicate their efforts to commercialize their 
inventions.  The first is the likelihood for many discoveries that direct ex-
ploitation by the inventor will be suboptimal, if not wholly impractical.  The 
point is yet another variation on the problem mentioned above—the uncom-
fortable mapping of dozens (if not hundreds) of inventions into the thousands 
(or millions) of lines of code in a single software product.  An independent 
inventor could not practicably commercialize an invention that improves 
Internet browsers, even if the invention is path breaking.  Thus, the network 
effects that entrench existing products suggest that the optimal way to deploy 
a new invention related to Internet browsers is to sell it to one of the incum-
bent browser developers so that it can be incorporated into their product.  As 
a matter of industry structure, that means that the independent software 
 
123.  See PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE MONEY OF INVENTION: HOW VENTURE 
CAPITAL CREATES NEW WEALTH 99 (2001) (“Almost all venture funds are designed to be self-
liquidating, that is, they must dissolve after ten to twelve years.”). 
124. SourceForge hosts over 100,000 open-source projects uploaded by individual users.  
SourceForge.net, SourceForge.net: About SourceForge.net, http://sourceforge.net/docs/about. 
125. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
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inventor is more likely than the independent inventor in other fields to need 
the kinds of complex business, financial, and legal competencies that are 
necessary for successful negotiations with the large incumbent firms in the 
industry. 
At the same time, those who populate the independent inventor channel 
are less likely to be well placed to conduct such negotiations successfully 
than innovators in the parallel channels.126  For example, successful innova-
tors in the venture-backed channel are likely to become incumbent firms 
themselves or to transfer their technology to incumbent firms in a consensual 
transaction.127  The venture capitalists that control the destiny of venture-
backed start-ups are a small group of players, often themselves former ex-
ecutives at incumbent firms, likely to enjoy professional and social 
relationships with the individuals at large firms that might be interested in the 
technology.  Thus, it would be surprising if they could not agree upon a con-
sensual arrangement for transfer of technology to an incumbent firm with a 
use for the technology.  The rarity of patent infringement litigation between 
venture-backed start-ups and incumbent firms underscores the point: despite 
the oft-expressed concern about runaway patent litigation, we are aware of 
no lawsuit in the industry in which a venture-backed start-up has sued a sub-
stantial incumbent firm for patent infringement. 
Similarly, products in the open-source channel seem to gain widespread 
commercial traction only after they have been adopted into the value chain of 
large incumbent firms.128  Because the successful adoption typically involves 
a partial merging of the development community with employees of the in-
cumbent (or incumbents) adopting the technology,129 the frequency of 
adversarial dispute resolution is small.  In any event, the limited frequency of 
patenting by open-source communities makes the offensive use of patents a 
strategy that is not readily available. 
Lacking those relationships, independent inventors (here as in other 
contexts)130 have been forced to resort to litigation to extract value from their 
 
126. For this reason, the availability of injunctive relief, the issue contested in eBay, is crucially 
important to the intermediaries in this channel.  See, e.g., Brief for Rembrandt IP Management, LLC 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 11, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 
1837 (2006) (No. 05-130) [hereinafter Brief of Rembrandt in eBay] (“In the absence of an 
injunction, a well-funded infringer either would not take a license from an independent inventor at 
all, or would do so on a playing field that vastly favored the infringer.”); Brief for United Inventors 
Ass’n & Technology Licensing Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 
1837 (No. 05-130) [hereinafter Brief of United Inventors Association et al. in eBay] (“Given the 
enormous imbalance of resources between big business and individuals, the predictable fight to an 
injunction is essential to make licensing a possibility.”). 
127. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
128. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. 
129. See Mann, supra note 20, at 12 (noting that a large proportion of important Linux 
contributors are now employed by a large proprietary firm, the Open Source Development Labs, 
and its corporate sponsors). 
130. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 465 (2004) (finding that 
litigated patents issue disproportionately to individuals or small firms, but often are transferred 
1616 Texas Law Review [Vol. 85:1579 
 
inventions.131  Thus, as we look at patent litigation in recent years in the soft-
ware industry, we now see that a substantial share of litigation involves such 
firms or their subsidiaries.132  To the economist, it might seem odd that nego-
tiations in this channel should fail so frequently.  But software technology is 
not easy to transfer.  For one thing, software inventors often will have diffi-
culty in persuading potential purchasers of the value of their inventions 
without disclosing the inventions in some detail.  Given the difficulty of 
protecting the value of the technology even with a well-considered patenting 
program, independent inventors reasonably might be reluctant to make such 
disclosures.  But a failure to disclose (by hypothesis) will make it harder to 
persuade a purchaser to pay the “true” value of the technology—a standard 
instance of Arrow’s information paradox.133  In the end, where venture-
backed firms could use their connections to get a receptive hearing from in-
cumbent firms, independent inventors that claim to have developed valuable 
technology are more likely to be dismissed as “kooks.”134  If they cannot 
obtain a serious hearing from large firms, their only recourse is to resort to 
legal coercion.135 
 
between issuance and litigation); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Stylized Facts of Patent 
Litigation: Value, Scope and Ownership 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
6297, 1997), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6297.pdf (“[I]ndividual-owned patents are 
at least as likely to be litigated as are corporate-owned patents.”). 
131. Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu’s discussion of the troubled development of an online music 
market provides an instructive parallel.  See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE 
INTERNET? 105–28 (2006).  It should have been clear to all concerned parties by 2000 that the 
efficiencies of online music distribution eventually would compel some method of easy digital 
distribution of music online.  But the brash early technology start-ups like MP3.com and Napster 
had no success at all in reaching consensual arrangements with the large media providers.  See 
WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE OF 
ENTERTAINMENT 98–102, 110–20 (2004) (detailing the early history of MP3.com and Napster, and 
the subsequent lawsuits by media providers).  But Steve Jobs, largely because of personal relations 
that spanned the divide between technology firms and the large media companies, was able to reach 
agreements in one fell swoop with all of those companies, facilitating both the iTunes store and the 
iPod.  See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra, at 118–21 (discussing the success of iTunes). 
132. That is not to say that there is never litigation among incumbents—IBM’s recent filings 
against Amazon.com, see infra note 151, and the high-profile litigation between AT&T and 
Microsoft, see Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007), underscore the occasional 
inability of large firms to reach rational settlements of these kinds of disputes. 
133. See Mann, supra note 103, at 2267–68 (discussing Arrow’s information paradox). 
134. For example, despite the general perception in the media (and on Capitol Hill) that NTP’s 
patent claims related to the BlackBerry were unfounded, see Ian Austen & Lisa Guernsey, A Payday 
for Patents ‘R’ Us, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2005, at C1 (discussing the view of critics that NTP is a 
“patent troll”), some industry sources portray Tom Campana (the inventor of the patent in question) 
as a thinker of great perception and foresight, see, e.g., Richard Shim, Key Figure in BlackBerry 
Case Dies, CNET NEWS.COM, June 17, 2004, http://news.com.com/Key+figure+in+BlackBerry+ 
case+dies/2100-1041_3-5238198.html (describing Campana as a “tireless and inventive engineer 
committed to perfecting the best that wireless technology has to offer”). 
135. One interesting, developing battleground in this area is the question of “transparency.”  
Incumbent firms call for transparency in the ownership of patenting, so that they readily can identify 
the real parties in interest when patents are issued or transferred.  Intermediaries anticipating 
litigation, however, prefer that their acquisition of patents go unnoticed.  This could be true for a 
spectrum of reasons of varying legitimacy, ranging from a Lemelson-like desire to allow 
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3. Patent Enforcement Intermediaries.—In a world of perfect markets, 
the conditions described above would summon into existence intermediaries 
specializing in the particular competencies that independent inventors are 
likely to lack: the ability to enforce patents aggressively against incumbent 
firms, the ability to raise funds to support the continuing development and 
exploitation of the technology, and (most important from a social 
perspective) the ability to facilitate the deployment of the technology by 
licensing it to the firms best placed to use it.  There can be no doubt that a 
substantial group of these firms has arisen—some of the most prominent (in 
alphabetical order) include Acacia Technologies Group, Altitude Capital, 
Intellectual Ventures, and Rembrandt IP Management.136  Indeed, if there is 
anything odd about the situation, it is not that some firms have arisen to ful-
fill those functions but that they have taken so long to appear.  Because none 
of the considerations discussed above explaining the rise of these intermedi-
aries has changed substantially in the last decade, it is not easy to see why 
they have arisen so rapidly in the last few years alone.137 
The activities of those firms illustrate, however, that each of them is 
pursuing a distinct strategy.  The best way to understand those strategies is to 
recognize that different inventors will fail in commercialization for different 
reasons.  Thus, the optimal exploitation strategies for different technologies 
will be different, which makes it natural to expect that a range of intermedi-
aries would arise specializing in different strategies.  As illustrated in Figure 
8, we organize those strategies along two different dimensions: the type of 
opportunity that the intermediary acquires and the source of funds on which 
the intermediary relies. 
a. Acquiring Litigation or Technology?—The most fundamental 
distinction relates to the type of asset on which the intermediary focuses.  
Here, we discern a spectrum from pure litigation on one end (with relatively 
 
competitors to become more dependent on a patent before revealing its existence to more pedestrian 
concerns, such as a desire to control the forum in which litigation will occur.  It is not entirely clear 
what the best solution is, but it is worth noting that many large companies have their patents held by 
a separate, nonpracticing company that has no assets other than intellectual property.  See Brad 
Stone, Factory of the Future?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 22, 2004, at 60 (noting that Microsoft, Intel, Sony, 
Nokia, and Apple have some of their patents held by a nonpracticing company called Intellectual 
Ventures). 
136. There are many smaller firms that exploit particular technologies.  E-Pass Technologies, 
for example, exists primarily to support the licensing of its patented smart-card product.  See E-Pass 
Technologies, Inc., Corporate Information, http://www.e-pass.com/corporateinfo.htm (“The 
company is primarily organized to promote the sales and marketing of the e-pass smart card . . . .”). 
137. The disparaging and poorly reasoned discussion in the concurring opinion of Justice 
Kennedy in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842–43 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring), certainly has contributed to the high visibility of the issue as a policy matter and the 
simplistic pejorative use of the term “troll” to refer to the wide variety of entities discussed here.  
Justice Kennedy made a passing reference to what he saw as the suspect quality of business-method 
patents, supported only by a reference to an article making several arguments that business-method 
patents were unconstitutional, arguments that were strange to say the least.  Id. 
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little regard for technology) to pure technology at the other end (with little 
regard for litigation).  Thus, at one end of the spectrum we would place firms 
like Acacia, which function much like the paradigmatic securities class ac-
tion law firm.  Essentially, those firms search for opportunities to acquire 
patents, frequently from defunct firms.138  With the patents in hand, they 
search broadly for companies that might be regarded as infringing those 
patents, often in market sectors far removed from the market at which the 
patent originally was directed.  Whenever they can present a colorable claim, 
they should be able to obtain a settlement from the defendant that at least re-
flects the expected present value of the defendant’s litigation costs (what 
some might deprecatingly call a “nuisance” settlement).  That activity will be 
privately profitable whenever those settlements exceed the often trivial cost 
that the intermediary must pay to acquire the patents.  The net social contri-
bution of that activity would depend on the balance between the funds that 
are flowing back to the original inventor (and thus providing an incentive for 
the innovative activity that generated the patent), balanced against the 
resources consumed in the litigation to enforce the patent. 
 
Figure 9: Schema of Patent Exploitation Intermediaries 
 
 
 
At the other end of the spectrum are firms focused more on the 
acquisition of technology than on litigation.  Here we place a firm like 
Altitude Capital, a firm with a relatively large share of veterans of hedge 
 
138. Acacia in particular has brought suits in several cases already relying on patents purchased 
from insolvent entities.  See Jeff Sandford, Stream Media Faces Lawsuit Test, WEB HOSTING 
MONTHLY, Sept. 2003, at 13, 13–14 (discussing Acacia’s acquisition of five patents for streaming 
media technologies and the company’s expectation of a large payoff from suits to defend those 
patents).  Because many of those entities are failed venture-backed start-ups, the activity affords a 
link through which assets in failed venture capital start-ups can be brought into the independent 
inventor channel.  However, it is not clear that the availability of that channel is important to 
investment decisions. 
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funds and of investment banks.139  In general, the goal is to earn a profit by 
skillful balancing of present and future cash flows related to the technology.  
Thus, a typical transaction for Altitude would involve immediate payment to 
the inventor in return for the present acquisition of a patent.  Altitude would 
hope to recoup the payment over time by revenues obtained from licensing 
the patent to an incumbent with a use for the technology.  For that transaction 
to succeed, Altitude must accurately assess the value of the technology—the 
likely future revenues that the patent will generate—and also must convert 
those revenues to an anticipatory payment stream accruing to the inventor.  If 
it is skilled at both of those tasks, Altitude should be able to earn a good re-
turn on the funds that it invests.  The social value of the activity, again, 
would turn on the balance between the funds flowing back to the original 
inventor and the transaction costs associated with Altitude’s activity.  If 
Altitude can succeed in generating sufficient revenue streams to earn a profit 
while both avoiding litigation and returning a substantial stream of funds to 
the original inventors, it is hard to quarrel with the model from a social per-
spective. 
Somewhere in between are firms (like Rembrandt) that buy into existing 
disputes and invest substantial resources to develop the dispute.140  The 
emphasis is on patent disputes that are already mature, in the sense that the 
technology already has been deployed in the market, so that the patents write 
onto existing products.  The core competency at which such a firm aims is an 
ability to precisely estimate the likelihood that the patent will be held valid, 
the likelihood that the defendant’s products will be found to infringe the 
patent, and the likely amount of damages a court will award for the 
infringement.  Those firms closely resemble the litigation-financing firms 
that have proliferated throughout the legal community in recent years,141 with 
the addition of a particular expertise in patent litigation. 
b. Funded by Financiers or Incumbents?—The discussion above 
also suggests that the identity of the investor in the intermediary should have 
structural significance.  Most of the patent-exploitation intermediaries rely on 
funds from external investors—pure financiers—with no particular role in 
the industry, and no strategic goal other than a substantial return on their 
investment.142  Indeed, some intermediaries explain that the detached view of 
the financier is central to the success of their model because it allows them to 
 
139. See Altitude Capital Partners, http://www.altitudecp.com/team.html (providing the 
biographies of Altitude Capital employees). 
140. See Brief of Rembrandt in eBay, supra note 126, at 1–2 (describing Rembrandt’s 
activities). 
141. E.g., Alison Frankel, Helping Underfunded Plaintiffs Lawyers—at a Price, LAW.COM, 
Feb. 13, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1139565913200. 
142. See Nathan Vardi, Patent Pirates, FORBES, May 7, 2007, at 44 (describing a private 
investment firm’s investment in an exploitation intermediary solely for the purpose of receiving a 
percentage of the winnings in a pending patent lawsuit). 
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pursue patent enforcement and litigation in a clinical and perfectly rational 
manner, unencumbered by the distractions of social or business relations that 
would come with funds from an incumbent.143  This unclouded and calculat-
ing rationality that independence brings seems to be an important cultural 
attribute of these firms—it came up in one way or another in all of our con-
versations with representatives of these firms. 
But not all firms have that perspective.  In particular, Nathan 
Myhrvold’s Intellectual Ventures entities rely on funding from a large set of 
the most important incumbents in the industry, with the conspicuous excep-
tion of IBM.144  Returning to the discussion above, it is easy to see what 
Intellectual Ventures provides that the financier-funded intermediaries 
cannot—the ability to use relational ties to overcome the information 
paradox that makes it so difficult for independent inventors to obtain fair 
value for their technology from large incumbent firms.  Thus, it should be no 
surprise to see that Intellectual Ventures appears to have been much more 
successful than any of the other prominent intermediaries at negotiating li-
cense agreements with major incumbent firms.145 
Looking at the “supply” side of the equation as well, it is easy to 
understand why incumbents would so willingly invest in an intermediary 
controlled by a person whom they know (like Myhrvold).  If the incumbent 
firms believe that they are wasting resources on litigation against “trolls” 
because of legal rules that (in the view of incumbents) give trolls an unfair 
return on their patents, the natural response of a rational incumbent would be 
to invest in the “troll” directly, so that the incumbent could recover the 
“unfair” returns that the troll earns in litigation against the incumbent.  
Whether incumbents are correct in that assessment of the situation, it seems 
fairly clear that it is the view of many of the incumbents, and something akin 
to such a view has helped to drive the investments in Myhrvold’s enterprises. 
In any event, the investments should be privately profitable if Myhrvold 
can obtain license revenues from the incumbent firms that are adequate in 
light of the funds he spends to acquire patents.  From a social perspective, 
assessing the value of the activity is similar to the assessment of the firms 
discussed above.  The question is whether the incentives arising from the 
funds that flow to original inventors through Myhrvold’s patent acquisitions 
exceed the drag on innovation reflected by the licensing fees that the incum-
bent firms pay.  Given the relatively low transaction costs of the licensing, it 
 
143. See Alan Cane, Trolls Control the Rickety-Rackety Bridge of Intellectual Property, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Sept. 20, 2006, at 2 (noting that exploitation intermediaries are free to seek 
injunctions because they have no market share or business relations to lose). 
144. Stone, supra note 135, at 60. 
145. This discussion substantially oversimplifies the business model of Intellectual Ventures.  
A large part of the acquisition strategy of Intellectual Ventures is wholly unrelated to any 
reasonably foreseeable enforcement of the patents.  Rather, it is designed to provide freedom to 
innovate in areas in which Intellectual Ventures hopes to be filing its own patent applications based 
on its own innovative activities.  See id. (describing Intellectual Ventures’ business plan). 
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is difficult to quarrel with the model from a social perspective (at least in the 
absence of some problem with the quality of the patents that Myhrvold ac-
quires and enforces). 
V. Conclusion 
The puzzle that primarily motivates this Article is why the 
pharmaceutical and manufacturing industries have monolithic perspectives 
on patent policy while each firm in the software industry seems to have a dif-
ferent position on patent policy—a position that is likely to change from time 
to time.  The usual answer is that the low ability of patents to appropriate in-
novation in the industry makes the patents less useful and thus lowers the 
social value of granting them.146  But that explanation would support a pat-
tern of persistent ambivalence.  What we see on the contrary is heated 
disagreement and instability of perspective. 
We think the history and data presented here provide a useful lens for 
understanding the views on patent policy of those in the industry.  For one 
thing, the role of patents has changed dramatically from the mid-1960s to the 
present.  In the mid-1960s, patents only had value for firms hoping to chal-
lenge IBM’s dominance in the production of computers and software.147  By 
the twenty-first century, in contrast, the industry has matured into a complex 
pattern, with at least four distinct groups (incumbents, venture-backed firms, 
open-source communities, and independent inventors and associated 
intermediaries), each with a different relation to the patent system. 
For many years, there was a debate over the fundamental question of 
patentability, a debate that remains open in the European Union to this 
day.148  In recent years, however, policy debates have shifted away from that 
question to converge on the idea that the system is broken in ways that call 
for changes in various details of patent policy.149  Thus, the main area in 
which there is a realistic likelihood of attempted retrenchment on patentabil-
ity in this country is in the area of business methods.  Because of the 
common confusion of technical software patents with software-implemented 
business-method patents, this presents a potential problem for software firms.  
The natural response by software firms may be to publicly differentiate the 
two and distance themselves from the latter.  IBM argued in Metabolite,150 
for example, in favor of ratcheting up the “useful application” standard to 
 
146. See Mann, supra note 62, at 978 (noting that a basic problem for software firms at all 
stages is the sense that even with a patent it is often difficult for a firm to appropriate the value of its 
invention). 
147. See id. at 1005 (describing IBM’s historic market dominance). 
148. See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
149. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 87–94 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) (arguing that 
the obviousness test should be changed). 
150. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (per 
curiam). 
1622 Texas Law Review [Vol. 85:1579 
 
require some “technological contribution,” which would bar the issuance of 
business-method patents that are not implemented in software or some other 
tangible product.151 
Another important area likely to see reform is the topic of patent 
quality.  Much of the criticism of patents focuses on a small number of 
highly visible and dubious patents.  Academics for several years now have 
been raising concerns about the quality of PTO patent review.152  Those con-
cerns focus on the difficulties that the PTO has faced in identifying the 
relevant prior art, especially in new technologies like software.153  The obvi-
ous policy response, if the details can be worked out, is some form of 
“community patent review” in which firms in the area of a proposed patent 
would have an opportunity to suggest relevant prior art before a patent is 
issued.154  Similarly, on the PTO’s side, the persistent public complaints 
about notoriously bad patents have resulted in a pointed emphasis on patent 
 
151. Brief of International Business Machines Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party at 30, Metabolite, 126 S. Ct. 2921 (2006) (No. 04-607); see also Supplemental Letter Brief of 
United States Patent and Trademark Office, In re Comiskey, No. 2006-1286 (Fed. Cir. filed Jan. 30, 
2006) (arguing that business methods are not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)).  The patents 
at issue in IBM v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 9:06 Civ. 242 (E.D. Tex. filed Oct. 23, 2006), and IBM v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 6:06 Civ. 452 (E.D. Tex. filed Oct. 23, 2006) appear to be precisely the kind 
of “technical method” patents that would be upheld under the position IBM urged in Metabolite.  
See FedCirc.us, Case Page for IBM v. Amazon, http://www.fedcirc.us/case-pages/ibm-v.-
amazon.html.  To be sure, some believe that “business methods” defines such an imprecise category 
that any effort to limit their patentability will be undermined by arbitrary line drawing and strategic 
gamesmanship by applicants.  See John R. Allison & Starling D. Hunter, On the Feasibility of 
Improving Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 729, 758–89 (2006) (discussing the insurmountable difficulties encountered in defining a 
“business method”); Jeffrey R. Kuester & Lawrence E. Thompson, Risks Associated with 
Restricting Business Method and E-Commerce Patents, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 657, 675–79 (2001) 
(discussing proposed legislation that would have raised the bar for obtaining business-method 
patents). 
152. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 206 (1998) (“[W]e cannot predict with confidence that 
patents in general are more likely to be held valid than invalid.”); Bhaven N. Sampat, Determinants 
of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis 3 (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST_Seminars/patentquality_new.pdf_1.pdf (finding that patent 
examiners are less likely to discover nonpatent prior art and foreign patents). 
153. Empirical evidence reveals, however, that problems with patent quality are not localized—
at least not in the case of software or software-implemented business methods.  See, e.g., John R. 
Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 
1036–77 (finding that Internet-related business-method patents issued through December 31, 1999, 
were not of lower quality and value than the average patent and patents in most other technology 
areas); Allison & Mann, supra note 7 (manuscript at 20–41) (finding evidence in a data set of 
20,000 computer-industry patents that software patents vary greatly in quality and value, but as a 
whole appear to be of higher quality and value than nonsoftware patents issued to the same group of 
firms and of higher quality and value than the general population of patents); Allison & Hunter, 
supra note 151, at 789 (arguing that problems with patent quality are systemic rather than localized 
and that reform efforts should focus on all subject matter areas); Allison et al., supra note 130, at 
448–64 (finding that patents in all areas of technology in the general population of patents are of 
apparently lower quality and value than those in all areas of technology that are litigated). 
154. For details on the progress of that initiative, see The Peer to Patent Project: Community 
Patent Review, http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/. 
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quality in the PTO’s proposed strategic plan for 2007–2012.155  The central 
concern is that without serious review of patent applications it makes little 
sense to continue to give patents the presumption of validity that traditionally 
goes with issuance. 
Even if those criticisms are anecdotal, most of the large patenting firms 
agree that the PTO could do a better job of locating relevant prior art and 
processing applications expeditiously.156  Thus, although those firms rely 
heavily on patents, it makes sense for them to support changes that would 
“raise the bar” of patentability.  The support for “gold-plated patents” 
suggests that those firms, for the most part, believe they would do just as 
well under a system in which it was harder to obtain patents than it is now.157  
Similarly, the positions taken in the KSR case suggest a general consensus, at 
least among large firms, that the standard for obviousness should be changed 
to make it easier for the PTO to reject patents.158 
Because these kinds of reforms affect only firms that apply for patents 
(or who compete in sectors with those who do), debate over them has been 
relatively technical.  That is not to say that the reforms affect all firms 
equally.  For example, proposals for community patent review promise more 
benefits to large firms with substantial patenting infrastructures than they do 
to smaller venture-backed start-ups.  It is to say, however, that the various 
initiatives have gotten more attention from the large incumbents than from 
smaller firms. 
The most prominent topic for debate has been the need for litigation 
reform.  Limitations on the availability of injunctive relief have appeared in 
recent patent reform bills and were urged upon the Supreme Court in eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.  Compared to patent-quality issues, rules on 
patent enforceability will affect different strategies in markedly different 
ways.  So, for example, in eBay representatives of the independent-inventor 
community and other technology licensors like Qualcomm predictably 
pressed for all but automatic injunctive relief.159  By contrast, representatives 
 
155. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2007–2012 STRATEGIC PLAN (2007), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/stratplan2007-2012.pdf. 
156. See, e.g., John P. Mello Jr., Patent Office Says Critics Wrong, Complete Review Provided, 
TECHNEWSWORLD, Apr. 12, 2005, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/42207.html (reporting 
criticism by IBM’s vice president for intellectual property that the PTO is unable to expeditiously 
process applications or adequately review prior art). 
157. The idea of gold-plated patents is that applicants who are willing to pay for a more 
thorough prior art search and more rigorous examination should receive a stronger presumption of 
validity for their patents than those who are not.  Mark Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad 
Patents?, REGULATION, Winter 2005–2006, at 10. 
158. See, e.g., Brief of IBM in KSR, supra note 4, at 26–30 (proposing an alternative test for 
nonobviousness that would allow the PTO to reject more patents). 
159. See Brief Amici Curiae of Martin Cooper et al. in Support of Respondent at 2, eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130) (“[T]he right of exclusivity means 
nothing without injunctive relief.”); Brief for Technology Patents & Licensing Inc. et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 30, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) (urging the Court not to 
disturb “the general rule that, in the usual case, injunctive relief is appropriate where infringement 
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of the open-source community and firms that are more likely to be defen-
dants in patent litigation lined up to argue vigorously for limitations on 
injunctive relief.160  Indeed, many of them argued for a categorical bar on 
injunctive relief in favor of “nonpracticing entities,”161 a position received 
sympathetically by some Justices.162 
Many industries consolidate as they mature into a small group of 
relatively homogeneous firms.  If that ever happens in the software industry, 
it will not happen soon.  Business models in the software industry differ 
starkly from firm to firm.  The still increasing variety in the uses to which 
software is put offers one reason.  Another comes from the common tactic of 
technology companies to leverage competencies at one part of the value 
chain against commoditization at another—IBM supporting “free” software 
that is compatible with its proprietary hardware, software, and service 
offerings; Adobe supporting one free product that facilitates use of its higher 
end proprietary products; even Microsoft supporting free small business 
accounting software that should increase demand for its proprietary product 
line.163  The variety of strategies, coupled with the relative difficulty of using 
IP to appropriate innovation in software, underscores the importance of at-
tention to context in designing IP rules for the industry.  The fact that every 
sector is offering views that support its own interests does not mean that 
 
and validity of a patent have been proved”); Brief of Amici Curiae Qualcomm Incorporated and 
Tessera, Inc. in Support of Respondent at 4, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) (“The current 
patent injunction principles do not require any judicial adjustment.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America in Support of Respondent at 3, eBay, 126 
S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) (“Given the ease with which infringers can reverse engineer 
pharmaceutical products . . . injunctive relief offers in many circumstances the only effective 
protection.”); Brief of Rembrandt in eBay, supra note 126, at 1–3 (arguing that injunctive relief 
should remain available to “non-practicing entities” that invest in patents but do not practice them); 
Brief of Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 
8, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) (arguing that the Court should not change the rule that “a 
patentee’s non-use of an invention does not bar the issuance of a permanent injunction”); Brief of 
United Inventors Association et al. in eBay, supra note 126, at 3 (“[T]his Court should reaffirm its 
precedents rejecting compulsory licensing and excluding non-use as a factor in granting patent 
injunctions.”). 
160. See Brief of Business Software Alliance in eBay, supra note 4, at 3 (arguing that district 
courts should apply traditional equitable factors in patent cases to determine whether injunctive 
relief is appropriate in a particular case); Brief of Research in Motion, Ltd. as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 3, eBay, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (No. 05-130) [hereinafter Brief of Research in 
Motion in eBay] (“[I]njunctive relief . . . is a discretionary remedy that may be accorded to patent 
owners only upon consideration of the equities of a particular case.”). 
161. See Brief of Business Software Alliance in eBay, supra note 4, at 23 (arguing that it would 
be difficult for a nonpracticing entity to demonstrate the irreparable harm necessary for injunctive 
relief); Brief of Research in Motion in eBay, supra note 160, at 14 (arguing that a patent assertion 
firm that “values its claim based solely on the damage it can inflict does not show irreparable 
harm”). 
162. See eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
163. See, e.g., Candace Lombardi, Microsoft Tries to Lure ‘Mom and Pop’ Companies, CNET 
NEWS.COM, Oct. 30, 2006, http://news.com.com/2100-1012_3-6130582.html (describing 
Microsoft’s Office Accounting Express 2007 as “an example of how Microsoft has been forced to 
change its business model as more software for small-business owners becomes freely available”). 
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policymakers should ignore those views; it means that they should be sure 
that any reforms they adopt do not accidentally elevate the temporary 
interests of firms using one strategy over those of firms using another. 
 
